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## MYTH AND THE CABALAS: *ADVENTURES IN THE UNSPOKEN*

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### I

When literary and philosophical discussion join today, the subject of myth must be placed high on the list of agenda. Intellectual interests seem to develop in clusters; and myth is not only the nucleus of one of the larger clusters today, but is a peculiarly amoeba-like nucleus which engulfs the discussions which gather around it. Questions concerning the nature of metaphor, image, and symbol, and of the very nature of poetry and of expression itself, tend to be reinterpreted in terms of myth. The cult of semantics which seeks to reform existence by a revision of symbols is a kind of projection of the mythological mind.

The voraciousness of myth in devouring related or adjacent subjects and converting them into its own substance cannot be better illustrated than by an actual occurrence at a scholarly meeting held not long ago. A professor in a well-known university had delivered a paper with the avowed intent of cutting under the question of myth to secure other bases for treatment. (He had described himself as "a

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kind of pre-Paul Elmer More humanist.") As the applause trickled away, the chairman of the discussion arose.

"This brilliant disclaimer of myth," he announced, "has only served to bring out the inevitability of myth in a new light. It contests the existence of certain myths in Shakespeare, but you cannot do this, of course, without automatically supposing others. The most you can say is that myth in Shakespeare isn't the kind of myth we thought it was. Does anyone have anything to add to my remarks?" No one had.

The literature on myth is extensive and growing. A convenient résumé and bibliography can be found in the invaluable new *Theory of Literature* by René Wellek and Austin Warren;<sup>1</sup> and some of the newer material is gone over in Stanley Edgar Hyman's "Myth, Ritual, and Nonsense" in a recent issue of the *Kenyon Review*.<sup>2</sup> Those who are familiar with the literature on myth worked over here, or with the discussion which weaves its way through avant-garde literary circles today, will know that the treatment given myth is often tortuous and groping, and occasionally loses its way. It is bewildered, and occasionally betrayed, by the confusion of interpretative theories which beset it on all sides. And yet, whether conducted under the aegis of the ritualist theory or as an attack on this theory, whether literary or antiliterary, the study of myth seems always to be pursuing pretty much the same game. If, as Mr. Hyman remarks at the opening of the article just cited, there is more than one way to skin a myth, it is also true that, no matter who does the skinning or how, myth skins all come from the same sort of animal. Beneath all the discussion and conflicting theory, there seems to be one central reality which has caught everyone's attention. There are regular hunting preserves over which the chase moves.

In terms of the conditions of the human intellect in its relations with the finite being toward which it is immediately faced, one can, I believe, plot the general area with which myth and mythology have to do. Such a plotting will not, of course, adequately settle all the questions agitated in the name of myth; but it will perhaps provide some insights into the question as to why the study of myth proves as intriguing as it does, and it will point to some of the connections between myth and current literary speculation. The attempt here will be to indicate a general framework for mythological discussion rather than to assign particular writers or theories to their place within the framework.

<sup>1</sup> New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1949.

<sup>2</sup> Summer, 1949 (XI, 455-75).

## II

A *prima facie* response to the term "myth" today would take the term as applying to a story having to do with religion which is circulated as true and taken as such by people who unfortunately are not so advanced as we are. This *prima facie* meaning has a long history which need not be detailed here. It has evidently come far since the Greeks originally used the word *mythos* to signify a word, speech, or some sort of vocalized sound, and is only remotely related to Aristotle's use of the same term as signifying the plot of a play (but notice the parallel English *fable* for "plot").

Closely allied to this *prima facia* meaning is the use of the word "myth" to signify a story featuring preternatural persons or personifications which is historically untrue. With this meaning, there grows another more sophisticated meaning: myth is such a story, which does not represent any truth of history, considered in terms of what truth it can be said to represent—that is, in terms of almost anything but historical truth. This concept involves, it will be seen, dealing with truth by a kind of indirection. The myth is told in the form of history—it is said that Prometheus did steal fire from heaven for man—though it is precisely as history that validity is wanting to myth. What is not is here employed after a fashion as a surrogate for what is.

This economy of indirection provides the real setting for what we may call the concept of myth in its quintessential form. As this term settles down in current discussion to a definitive meaning, it comes eventually to refer to the nonexplicit complement accompanying any body of expression, story or not, when this complement is considered as forming a whole. It is what is expressed indirectly precisely insofar as it is expressed indirectly. Myth in this sense is that which fills in the voids between man's abstractions.<sup>3</sup> It is, more quizzically and pointedly, what one says when one says something else. Exponents of myth do not always put it so outspokenly as this; but if a person holds this description in mind as he trails along through mythological treatises, particularly those of the more heady kind, he will find himself able to identify most of the game which will be disappearing into the bushes around him.

The concept of myth here is shaped by a condition of human knowledge. Large bodies of more or less general statements roughly connected with one another carry with them a kind of substructure of suppositions, unexpressed and even unformulated, but more or less

<sup>3</sup> Wellek and Warren, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-97.

definitely implied. For example, the more or less general statements centered about the "doctrine" of "progress" have beneath them a definite body of suppositions, many of them not yet conceptualized, not yet brought to light. So with the things that have been said in the name of democracy, of humanitarianism, and so on.

Such suppositions are hardly on the tip of everyone's tongue. They are discovered only slowly after a good deal about humanitarianism or democracy or what have you has been ventilated and acted upon. Before they are discovered and formulated, conceptualized, where are these suppositions? And what are they? They are not yet abstract statements, formally constituted truths. Yet one can consider them as forming some sort of whole, delimited by what has been explicitly said. Indeed, it is in a sense this whole which bestows on "democracy" what unity it has; for the formally enunciated tenets of democracy or humanitarianism often seem in themselves at odds with one another, hard to reconcile with one another as they stand in themselves, unsupported by further explanation. The student of such a thing as democracy has often as his task the discovery of the unifying element. He seeks to formulate the underlying, as yet unconceptualized, but somehow unified body of "suppositions."

The fact that his work is often styled a search attests the fact that the suppositions are indeed somehow there before he "discovers" or formulates them. They have been in some way a coherent thing even before their discovery or formulation—we need not wait on this formulation in order to apprehend democracy as a unified thing. These suppositions are the "myth," *so long, that is, as they are not formulated*. For myth, in this ultimate sense, is the unconceptualized undertrussing or complement supporting bodies of human statement and conveyed in them precisely insofar as this undertrussing remains an unconceptualized but somehow intrinsically coherent whole.

One might make this theorem absolute and say, instead of "bodies of human statement," simply "any human statement," for it would seem that suppositions of the sort here styled myth accompany any human utterance, even the most simple. For the present, however, it will suffice to restrict ourselves to the more obvious cases of myth, those implied and defined in bodies of human statement of some extent, such as the myth of Shakespeare's *Macbeth* or the myth of democracy.

Those interested in myth in the sense just explained like to point out that such myth will never be completely formulated. There will always be a residue of unformulated myth after every formulation. Put another way, this sounds not so disquieting. It means that any body

of connected human statement will, first, be limited, and, secondly, will have certain things implicit in it, no matter how far it is refined. Total human statement is impossible.

This does not at all mean that all human statement is enveloped in falsehood; much less does it mean that human statement—that especially which is concerned with ultimates—is devoid of content, although there is a temptation, often given in to, to falsify the records just a little bit and make things come out this way. What it does mean is that it is impossible to say something which does not run off at the margin into things not said. It means that it is impossible to put a statement so that nothing *about* it can be misunderstood. This is not the same as saying that I cannot make myself clear about anything; it is only to say that in making myself clear about one thing, I shall always be hinting obscurely at other things about which I am not clear.

Expression in human terms, in other words, it not all act, but is quite replete with potency. This is to say no more than that human statement, like all things finite, is not self-contained, not pure act, but is faced outward to other things—ultimately to God, who is not this way because he does not in himself admit of explanation, but is rather explanation itself.

### III

The economy of indirection exploited by myth and mythology derives ultimately from a peculiar devotion to the potential coefficient as such in finite being.

The explicit and the implicit in human statement are related to one another as act and potency. Somewhat as man is what he is (his essence can be predicated of him directly), so a human statement is what is explicitly said. But this very "what" has a certain obliquity about it. What a man is (his essence) carries with it what he is not (for example, his intellect, which is a potency). Similarly, finite expression has about it an obliquity, an indirection. Each implicit statement carries with it something it is not, an implicit, which is a kind of potency. In devoting itself to this implicit something, to the indirect in human statement precisely as it is indirect, the study of myth is capitalizing on the potential coefficient in human expression.

Moreover, the study of myth exploits this potential coefficient in human expression in a curiously dramatic, all-out fashion. Myth admits of not only a scientific, but a mythological exegesis, an exegesis which is not explicit, as that of the philosopher would be, but implicit and nonabstractional. Asked what his myth means, the myth-maker

may well answer by another myth. In doing so, he not only attends to the potential component in expression, but does so in such a way as to honor this potential component in the very process.

There is a way to attend to the potential coefficient in terms of act after the fashion of philosophical explanation, which makes the implicit explicit and then deals in the explicit as such. Even so, of course, the philosopher has attaching to his explanation so executed certain implicit and still-to-be-explained areas. But it is to the others, to the explicit areas, that he attends. He seeks increased explicitness.

The myth-maker does otherwise. Aware of the implicit areas which attach to human statement, he prefers to keep clear as far as possible of explicit statement as such. To be sure, as he refines his implicit meaning, he must resort to statement in some way explicit; but he keeps the explicitness as far as possible irrelevant. Prometheus did not really steal fire from heaven, as he is said explicitly to have done, and Pandora's box, historically and explicitly considered, is a hoax.

Such a retreat into implicitness may conceivably be tantamount to a denial of the right to philosophize, but it need not be so. The myth-maker may be hinting that his is the only way to possess truth (the term "truth" being thereupon given a curiously introverted and tortured meaning)—that is, that truth can be known not expressly at all but only implicitly. This is modernism, or something pretty close to it. It seems to be the ultimate position not only of Gnosticism, but also of Protestantism, as well as of most unattached high-flown religious speculation today. As to whether it is doctrine or no, one can only say that in this matter it keeps a little o' the windy side of the law, being simply the assumption that there is no such thing as explicit truth, together with the refusal to state the assumption explicitly. Any deficiencies it may have are amply covered by sheer elusiveness. It rejects any sort of explicit statement, even of its own position.

But the myth-maker need not assume this pose and deny all right to philosophize. He may simply forego philosophical activity without denying its validity. If his retreat from explanation into further myth comes to this, it is of course unobjectionable. Everyone does not have to philosophize when requested to do so. And the myth-maker as such does indeed have access to reality in a fashion which the philosopher or other scientist as such is obliged to forego. Though it be good and even necessary, given the conditions of human intellection, explicitation is not an unmixed good, for human intellection is not perfect intellection. It might be remarked that whereas Christ explained some parables by making their reference explicit,

others he explained by still further parables, and still others he let sink in without explanation.

Although myth as such dwells very much in the never-never land of potency between the *is* and the *is not*, and, although this land has its disadvantages and is, in its way, unreal, one must not pretend that it is a territory unknown to man or dangerous to him. It is the territory man has to do with directly; and if he has difficulty in exploring it, this is not because he has or should have nothing to do with it, but because it has limitations which he shares. It is not pure act, pure being.

#### IV

In terms of its preoccupation with the potential coefficient of reality, the connection of myth with philosophical and theological interests on one side and with literary interests on the other can be seen. One notes immediately that the study of myth rides along with the interest in evolution and development which has marked the philosophical thought of the past two centuries and which is an interest not directly in existence, but in potency and becoming.

Evolution may be considered as referred to the world of being or to the world of knowing. Within the latter world, one notes a close approximation between "myth" in the sense discussed here and the earlier, likewise baffling, expressions "spirit," "idea," or "ethos"—for example, the "spirit" or "idea" or "ethos" of progress, of democracy, of the machine, Newman's "idea" of a university or "idea" of Christianity or the other "ideas" which, in *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, he instances as undergoing development. The term "myth" can be applied to all these items to which the earlier terms applied and today is actually so applied to many or most of them.

A too innocent idealism might like to suppose that these "ideas" and the entire Hegelian world with which they connect are matters of pure intellectuality and intellectual formulation, that one is here in a world of complete abstraction and hence of complete formulation—of act in this sense rather than of potency. However, as it comes down to us from the mechanistic and mathematical philosophies through the associationists, the "idea" does not represent a full-fledged abstraction as such at all, but a semiabstraction, a concept with its accompanying phantasm, or perhaps a phantasm regarded as prolific of concepts.

Hence it is that the idea can evolve. Maintaining a special rapport with matter, it can have a history suggesting its close connection with

material beings, whose very essences are partly potency, a developmental history such as an entirely spiritual thing could not have.<sup>4</sup> It is no accident that the editors of the *Journal of the History of Ideas* have made this sort of "idea," and not the concept, the object of their study.

Discussion of being in terms of "ideas" is discussion which fixes as its ultimate division of being not potency and act, but rather mixtures polarized toward one or the other of these two ultimates. The characteristic result of this procedure, observable in the tradition of Hegelian dialectic, is a series of exercises on the theme of becoming, exercises which can be started from any point whatsoever and protracted in a potentially infinite series, operations in the realm of the still-to-be-realized—legitimate operations, be it said, provided the operator knows what he is operating with and is prepared to pay for startling insights the high, but perhaps not exorbitant, fee of constant intellectual feverishness and overstimulation.

As much as this is the world of Hegel, it is also the world of current speculation in myth, where explanation is always big with promise which it never quite brings to term. It is also the closely adjoining world of Freud, where explanation is oriented—not perversely or arbitrarily, but inevitably—toward sex, which is a set not toward existence, but toward becoming. It is an annoying world, and by definition and intent an incomplete one, but it is not quite a fruitless world.

The "ism" mentality which rules much philosophical thought today finds in this same world its natural habitat. For the "isms" are of a piece with "ideas," putting in their appearance under the same auspices

<sup>4</sup> Hence it is, too, that the notion of "analysis" comes into play in the area around "ideas." St. Thomas Aquinas, considering things not in terms of "ideas," but in terms of concepts, described the origin of first principles as coming about in every case, in metaphysics as well as in the physical sciences, by a kind of induction, an insight into the phantasm—see Peter Hoenen, S.J., "De origine primorum principiorum scientiae," *Gregorianum*, XIV (1933), 153-84; Edmund H. Ziegelmeyer, S.J., "The Discovery of First Principles according to Aristotle," *THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN*, XXII (March, 1945), 132-43. But as the "idea" has gained in ascendancy within the past few hundred years, the tendency has been to explain first principles as produced by "analysis" of one or the other or both of the terms which constitute the principle. The inductive process—a process of emergence out of the material into the intellectual world—has been relatively neglected because the implications of an emergence of the purely intelligible out of the material have been passed over in favor of operations within a "mixed" order—a mélange of the intelligible and the sensible. "Analysis," which, like other things within the world of "ideas," involves a carefully sustained rapport with the material as such, seems to be an operation within such a mélange.

and becoming discernible only as interest in "ideas" gathered momentum. It is hard to believe that ancient languages, and even modern languages up to recent times, could be so devoid as they are of terms and apparatus for handling "isms." The "isms" put in their appearance late, for they are simply "ideas" considered less in point of their reference to knowledge and more in function of an analogy with real being. "Communism" is a fraction more substantial than the "idea of communist society."

## V

The economy of indirection and ultimately of potency which is exploited by myth and determines its relationship with philosophical thought also governs the connections of myth with subjects of current literary interest. Several such subjects were mentioned at the beginning of this article: metaphor, image, symbol, the nature of poetry and of human expression, and the cult of semantics.

The fact that current literary theory has been so dominated by interest in metaphor is highly symptomatic. Metaphor is the rhetorical device of direction par excellence, a kind of apotheosis of indirection as such (as its Greek etymology and the Latin term for the same thing, *translatio*, both attest), the use of a term which has been attached to one concept for another concept. The currency in all quarters of questions turning on metaphor has been both a symptom of the interest in indirection and a spur to develop the interest further.

Development of this interest naturally extended to consideration of the symbol and image, concerning both of which there is so great a bulk of contemporary literature. The symbol and the image are not only, like metaphor, variants on the theme of indirection played by myth; they are also the products of a movement away from abstraction toward a kind of implicitness and hence have an affinity with myth on a second score. Coleridge, whose discussion of the symbol still lives in literary theory and practice, sees the symbol precisely as a flight from abstraction, a relief from the sort of thing encountered in allegory. Allegory is merely "a translation of abstract notions into a picture-language, which is itself nothing but an abstraction from objects of the senses," whereas a symbol

is characterized by a translucence of the special [the others of the species] in the individual, or of the general [the diverse species of the genus] in the special . . . ; above all by the translucence of the eternal through and in the temporal. It always partakes of the reality which it renders intelligible, and while it enunciates the whole,

abides itself as a living part in that unity of which it is the representative.<sup>5</sup>

In its ability to be representative while escaping after a fashion from being a genuine abstraction, the symbol can be regarded as a kind of universal concept in disguise. With its aid, the myth-maker can achieve a sort of universality by hinting, a universality a little less than explicit, just as he would wish it to be. When literary theory talks symbol, it is very much in the territory frequented by myth.

The relationship between myth and poetry which makes metaphor, image, and symbol standard equipment for both is established by the fact that poetry does not restrict itself to the conceptual ranges of human knowledge as such, but carries on a traffic with the infraconceptual as well. Hence discussion of the nature of poetry itself tends to cover the same sort of ground as discussion of myth.<sup>6</sup> The resemblances between poetry as such and myth are, indeed, remarkably close; for, as against other types of art such as music, poetry carries on its dealings with the infraconceptual by a kind of indirection. The materials with which it operates, words, are quite different from musical sounds in that they are explicitly vehicles for concepts rather than for the infraconceptual, with which they are concerned only obliquely.

But the interest in metaphor and allied subjects which feeds back and forth between myth and poetry feeds on out even further from the consideration of the nature of poetry into the treatment of discourse as such and into the knotty field of semantics. I. A. Richards and others after him have made their chief point concerning metaphor the fact that it should be regarded not as an "ornament" but as a device natural and inevitable in speech.<sup>7</sup> And so, indeed, it is. The result of Mr. Richards's insistence here has been to import into the entire field of communication or expression as such the emphases common to myth

<sup>5</sup> *The Statesman's Manual*, Vol. I of *The Complete Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, ed. W. G. T. Shedd (New York: Harper & Bros., 1884), pp. 437-38. Cf. Wellek and Warren, *op. cit.*, pp. 193, 330, where it is noted that Coleridge's distinction had been made earlier by Goethe. For a typical and discerning contemporary statement on the symbol, see Max Brod, *Franz Kafka: A Biography*, trans. G. Humphreys Roberts (New York: Schocken Books, 1947), p. 194: "The symbol stands on both levels at the same time, on the level which it describes by suggestion and on the objective, real level, etc."

<sup>6</sup> Mr. Hyman, in the article already cited (pp. 462, 467), objects, quite understandably, to Richard Chase's performance in the latter's book *Quest for Myth*, which Chase concludes with a chapter interpreting a half-dozen English poems as though they were myths. But Mr. Chase has had predecessors and will have successors. It might be observed that particularly when it is considered in terms of "poetic truth," poetry tends to be confused with myth.

<sup>7</sup> Wellek and Warren, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

and poetry—the emphases on indirection and, ultimately, on the potential coefficient in human knowledge and expression. As has been noted earlier here, some sort of indirection can indeed be discovered everywhere if that is what you are after. There are analogies between the indirection of poetry and myth and the limited, finite condition of other forms of human expression. If there has been a tendency in some quarters to make things exciting, but just a little too simple, by expanding analogies into equations, by hinting that even with Basic English the communications system at the level of explication is at root an illusion—maybe the Chinese simply *never* understand what we are saying—this sort of heady speculation can perhaps be written off as sheer overenthusiasm.

Interest in the implicitness of language feeds also into most of the views which seek to find salvation for man in linguistic operations or attitudes and which ride the current of literary speculation rather high today. Such would be the views of Alfred Korzybski and his disciples, who propose the semantic solution for personal and cosmic problems, or of the earlier Richards, with his hopes in poetry as the instrument of salvation for man. Views such as these are generated by an awareness of the disorder which often lies not so much in explicit expression as in implicit suppositions. Korzybski proposes to operate rather directly on the suppositions.<sup>8</sup> Richards had looked for a more indirect approach: good poetry was to do away with the disorder at the infraconceptual level.<sup>9</sup>

## VI

For all the wealth of insight it provides and for all its usefulness, it is quite possible for preoccupation with myth to become sterile and degenerate into an elaborate hoax. This it does when it pretends to preclude or to overrule the abstractive disciplines. When it does this, it will not do so explicitly, let alone theoretically, for the reason that there is no explicit mythical theory available *in terms of myth*. When myth precludes or overrules the abstractive disciplines, pretending that it is only the myth as such that can be true and/or ultimate, it will do so by implication, mythically.

This is the way the cult of myth operated in Nazi Germany. It is the way it operates in the Soviet Union, where an aberrant science is

<sup>8</sup> Alfred Korzybski, *Science and Sanity* (New York: Science Press, 1933), *passim*.

<sup>9</sup> See Walter J. Ong, S.J., "The Meaning of the 'New Criticism,'" *THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN*, XX (May, 1943), 208-9; Wellek and Warren, *op. cit.*, pp. 147, 201.

quickly brought to heel. It is the way it tends to operate in America when the myth of "Americanism" rather than fact is made the basis of the Ku Klux Klan or something like Paul Blanshard's recent tirades. (It might be noted that the explicitation of its dogma and, even more basically, the fact that it is, and conceives of itself as, a concrete body of persons keep the Catholic Church as a reality essentially independent of any myth of "Catholicism" which might develop.<sup>10</sup> Significantly, the Apostles' Creed does not read, "I believe in Catholicism," but "I believe in . . . the Holy Catholic Church.")

Too complete devotion to myth which decries all explicitation is based on an obsession with a half-truth. It is one thing, however, to know that nothing is absolute, complete act, but God. And it is another thing to hint that no explicitation of expression can be a *participation* in the absolute, that it must be an illusion.

Myth should, to be sure, serve as a kind of corrective to those who want to make too much of explicitation. The foes of myth have been at times guilty of false emphases here. An insidious rationalism has wanted more ultimates than God himself. Under the spell of this rationalism, it is possible to make too much of "eternal truths"—which in fact, only insofar as they are identified with God, are strictly eternal. There is no rack of "eternal principles" alongside God where one can shelve the various sciences and all reality. Certainly, there are explicit principles; and these are true exactly as we know them. But it is not *as we know them* that they are eternal. They are eternal as God knows them. God knows the principle of contradiction in its cause, namely himself. He does not see his existence in terms of such a principle, as we do. He sees the principle in terms of his existence, which is his essence, which is *the* eternal. Before creation, there was God and that was all.

When, in honoring the limitations and enigmatic character of our dealings with reality as this is carried out on the finite plane, the pursuit of myth works against the tendency to make a set of abstractions do for God, it does well. But it does entirely too well when it hints that all explicitation, any explicit participation in the absolute, is an illusion. Insofar as it so hints, the study of myth is a hoax; for,

<sup>10</sup> One might mention that there could be a Christian "myth" in the sense of what is implicit and as yet unformulated in Catholic teaching and practice insofar as this implicit and unformulated complement constitutes a coherent whole apprehended (implicitly) in Catholic teaching and practice. Although, as applied to Christianity, the term is not often given this generous sense and, of course, tends to invite misunderstanding, still the state of current discussion can leave it open to such a sense.

whatever it may pretend, myth does employ explicit statement and thereby attests to the presence of the explicit in the world. For, just as there is no total human statement, no total explicitness, so *there is no total myth*, no total implicitness.

The total or pure myth would be a story, not without words, but one in which the words were devoid of any explicit meaning—each word, that is, quite undifferentiated from the others. This would be a sort of pure intellectual potency posing as expressive of something—in short, as act. Popularly, it might well be described as universal intellectual balderdash.

It is a lie to pretend that all the myth-maker does is hint, that in any given case *all* can be indirection. The myth operates in a world apprehended in terms of explicitation as well as of myth. The story of Prometheus is not a little influenced by explicitly apprehended truths about fire—for example, that it cooks things—though the influence of these truths is not felt in the same way as it is in scientific statement. Indeed, it is in function of the residue of abstraction of which it can never rid itself that one myth will fall back upon another for “explanation.”

Practically speaking, literary study of myth today is often inclined to succumb to a self-intoxication, hinting that all explicitation is an illusion and that ultimately in myth alone is any meaningful apprehension of reality to be found. In this land of indirection, to steer clear of this position, it is hardly sufficient to avoid stating it explicitly—for here it is to what is *not* stated that one particularly lends ear. To keep clear of the implication—and, indeed, to keep oneself clear of the supposition—it is rather necessary once in a while to state the opposite.

Mythological study is in a peculiar position with regard to anthropology and psychoanalysis. These two disciplines have not only in various ways pursued the study of myth, but, in the popular mind, have become myths themselves. In the land occupied jointly by anthropology and psychoanalysis, it is felt that there sits some court of ultimate appeal, vaguely presided over by the dimly luminescent figures of Sir James George Frazer and Freud, flanked perhaps by Jung and Lévy-Brühl. Before this court of appeal, the popular myth has it, all human activities are somehow to be arraigned—those which have not been already tried and found wanting.

Current exploitation of myth is often, one senses, a response to the drives set up by this myth concerning anthropology and psychoanalysis. To precipitate discussion in terms of myth becomes, for

those under the spell of this myth, largely a means of purchasing intellectual standing. Talking the court's jargon is reassuring. Moreover, the anthropology-psychoanalysis myth is peculiarly charming in the way in which such things are. It is a myth having to do with the very subject of myth itself and thus exhibits the curiously involuted character which myth assumes as one myth is validated by another ad infinitum.

But, as can be seen from the state of affairs here, to succumb to the self-intoxication of myth so as to seek to live by it alone is to give carte blanche to all sorts of drives indiscriminately. For myth, as myth, is blind and uncritical. Only insofar as truths are made explicit can they as such be put to the test. Without some explication, the question of truth and falsehood cannot even be broached, let alone settled. False myths cannot be told from true ones; and one is likely to end, as the Nazis and others have done, enslaved by an unreality which ultimately one has to set about enforcing.

When it yields to the self-intoxication and narcissism which constantly threaten it, the study of myth becomes a mere drill in the age-old antics of Gnosticism. Begging the question of truth and falsehood without ever being so gauche as to own it is doing so, such study can be merely an exercise in frustration. The key to the cabala is kept in a box locked with another key kept in another locked box, and so on.

One recalls how the Gnostic Manichees of St. Augustine's day kept putting him off: he would understand better when he had heard the exegeses of the next exegete, who was soon to speak his piece. Augustine finally heard him, as he writes in the *Confessions*, but all he had to add to the endlessness of former explanations was his rhetoric, which, Augustine had to admit, was superb. In the Gnostic chase, it is only the pursuit which intrigues. As the quarry digs in and the hunters delve deeper and deeper without stop—for to potency there is no bottom—one comes to forget after a while that there is a quarry, until, sooner or later, death or something similarly definite intervenes to pull us up with the realization that myth is not all.

For all this, the value of current discussions of myth is not to be made light of, let alone scornfully dismissed. Our knowledge runs off into the depths. Human intellection is spotty. Islands of conceptualized knowledge are joined by dark seas of knowing which, in one way or another, are still laid up in the senses. These seas have their beauty, too. Their content should not be suspect, nor should interest in them

be so. And since they are dark, one can certainly be excused for talking about them a little darkly.

But, once aware of the submarine elements in the human pursuit of truth, let us not deceive ourselves with false hopes. Scrutinized by means of the narrow beam of light thrown from a discursive intellect such as man's, however piercing it be, however fast it move, these seas prove endless. The explorer will indeed always find plenty to do here. We need not grudge him a lifetime of work. But if he does not take his bearing occasionally by explicit, recognizable landmarks, he is liable to be lost, and his discoveries with him.

There are false hopes which interest in myth, as well as in many other things, may breed. There is not only the myth of industrialism or the myth of imperialism or the myth of democracy. There is the myth of the myth, too.

## IN DEFENSE OF THE SYLLOGISM

HENRY VEATCH

At the present juncture, to undertake such a thing as a defense of the syllogism would seem not merely to smack of obscurantism, but actually to be, in Professor Lewis's words, "the apotheosis of stupidity."<sup>1</sup> And yet, even while quite ready to admit the possibility that we may be obscurantist or stupid, or both, we should nevertheless like to try in this present paper to press home the point that, after all, the proper, the original, and the apparently long-forgotten ground for a defense of the syllogism lies in nothing more nor less than philosophical realism itself.

Indeed, it is doubtless that radical and, if you like, uncritical realism of Aristotle's which accounts for the marked contrast between a logical treatise such as the *Posterior Analytics* and the kind of logical treatise that we have come to expect from modern mathematical logicians.

Thus, for one thing, it must doubtless have struck many readers that what Aristotle seems most concerned about in his discussion is a knowledge of causes, whereas what a modern logician would seem to be almost never concerned with is a knowledge of causes. More specifically, it might be said to be Aristotle's conviction (a) that for any real knowledge and understanding of things one must know such things through their causes, and (b) that such knowledge through causes is made possible in and by the syllogism. Thus

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<sup>1</sup> C. I. Lewis, *A Survey of Symbolic Logic* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1918), pp. 1-2.

we suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing, as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in which the sophist knows, when we think that we know the cause on which the fact depends . . .<sup>2</sup>

And then he continues:

What I now assert is that at all events we do know by demonstration. By demonstration I mean a syllogism productive of scientific knowledge, a syllogism, that is, the grasp of which is *eo ipso* such knowledge.<sup>3</sup>

Moreover, what makes the syllogism so peculiarly adapted to provide such a knowledge through causes is that the syllogism turns on the middle term. And of the middle term Aristotle says,

We conclude that in all our inquiries we are asking either whether there is a "middle" or what the "middle" is: for the "middle" is precisely the cause, and it is the cause that we seek in all our inquiries.<sup>4</sup>

But turning now to mathematical logic, one finds that while there is often much talk about inference, there is little if any talk about causes. For instance, as regards theorems from the propositional calculus such as  $p \supset q \supset r : p \supset r$  or  $\sim p \vee \sim q \supset \sim(p \wedge q)$ , while these would certainly be considered to be examples of so-called "validating forms of inference,"<sup>5</sup> they would hardly be thought to be peculiarly adapted for providing us with the means of understanding things through their causes.

Of course, one might retort that it is not the business of logic to search for causes, that being rather the task of such disciplines as natural science, natural philosophy, and first philosophy. Instead, logic would seem to be purely formal; and as such its concern would be simply with the forms of human thought (or, if you will, of human expression),<sup>6</sup> and not at all with their content.

Now such a position regarding the nature and competence of logic, while it may be generally accepted, would nonetheless seem to be rather misleading. For although logic certainly does not investigate the real causes of real things, being only concerned with the forms of thought and expression, still it might very plausibly be urged that the objective of all human thought is understanding, and that the way to understand things is to get at their causes. Hence, albeit the

<sup>2</sup> *An. Post.*, I, 2 (7lb8-10).

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* (7lb16-18). Cf. 85b22.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 2 (90a5-7).

<sup>5</sup> This phrase is, of course, Professor Whitehead's. Cf. R. M. Eaton, *General Logic* (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1931), p. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Or perhaps just with forms as such, whatever they may be the forms of.

business of logic may not be to disclose the causes of things, it certainly is its business to disclose the forms of thought in which and by which we are able to get at the causes of things.

But once more, the mathematical logician would probably insist that such a contention was simply irrelevant, so far as logic is concerned. Why? Simply because, he would insist, it is a matter of indifference to the logician, *qua* logician, what the objective of human thought is. For whatever its objective may be, it has its own formal structure, and the business of logic is to investigate just that formal structure and nothing else.

Thus it really makes no difference whether one thinks of logic as being concerned simply with linguistic conventions and what may be syntactically derived from them, or whether with Professor Lewis<sup>7</sup> one would have logic embrace any investigation that concerns itself with the analytic contents of our own meanings, or whether with Professor Quine<sup>8</sup> one rather haphazardly singles out certain presumed "basic particles" such as "is," "not," "and," "or," "unless," "if," "all," "some," and so on, and then declares that logic in the narrower sense includes only those truths in which none but the basic particles occur "essentially" and all others "vacuously," such truth being "recognizable on inspection merely of the statements themselves." In all of these variant descriptions of logic, the basic thrust would appear to be the same. For "the fundamental characteristic of logic" which emerges from all of these accounts is, as Russell<sup>9</sup> would have it, "that which is indicated when we say that logical propositions are true in virtue of their form."

And what such formalism is taken to mean is simply that empirical considerations are utterly irrelevant to the subject matter of logic.<sup>10</sup> For both in its point of departure and in its exfoliation and development, the science of logic is held to proceed in complete independence of, and indifference to, any considerations as to the nature and

<sup>7</sup> C. I. Lewis, *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Pub. Co., 1946), Book I, *passim*, esp. pp. 111-30.

<sup>8</sup> W. V. Quine, *Mathematical Logic* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1947), pp. 1-4.

<sup>9</sup> B. A. W. Russell, *The Principles of Mathematics* (2d ed.; New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1938), p. xii.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Lewis, *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, pp. 110-11: "They [i.e., meanings and relations of meanings] neither forbid nor require any possibility of sense-experience; and no sense-experience or the lack of it can weigh either for or against them. . . . They have the security of the intangible and the non-existent; the kind of security and fixity which belongs to logic." (Permission to use this quotation has kindly been granted by the publisher.)

character of reality. Moreover, this restriction of logic to the domain of the analytic and the *a priori* simply serves to point up that characterization of modern mathematical logic which we suggested in an earlier paper,<sup>11</sup> viz., that its most striking feature is its pretended *a priori self-sufficiency*.

In contrast, Aristotelian logic, when properly understood, is through and through an intentional logic, whose constant concern is for the *intentional adequacy* of its logical forms. In other words, so far from being interested in logical forms merely in themselves and for their own sake, the Aristotelian logician always thinks of logical forms in the light of their suitability and fitness for disclosing the nature of being. Or, more accurately, the Aristotelian logician so conceives the nature of logical forms that on his view these forms simply are intentions and consequently to consider them in themselves simply is to consider them in relation to the being and reality which they are adapted to disclose.

Nor should it be too hard to see how these standards of intentional adequacy in logic are not merely compatible with, but actually entailed by, any sort of position in first philosophy that might be called realistic in the classical Aristotelian sense. For the thrust of such philosophical realism consists simply in the insistence that there are real things, that neither the nature nor the existence of these things is dependent upon our thought about them, and finally that we human beings can painstakingly and at least to a degree come to know these real things as they are in themselves and not merely as they are relative to us.

Accordingly, in the context of such realism, logic is to be thought of as the organon or instrument of realistic knowledge. And as such an organon, it must be adapted to the task of simply revealing or disclosing the natures of things, without in any way changing them or distorting them. Consequently, the study of logic is the study of entities which are nothing but transparent intentions; and such intentions must be investigated by the logician precisely in their transparent intentionality.

From such a point of view, then, it is not difficult to see why in a treatise on logic Aristotle should have had so much to say about causes. For, after all, any realistic philosophy must needs insist that the real objects of the natural world both are, and are what they are, through their causes. Consequently, any understanding of them as they are has to be an understanding of them in and through their causes. But to this end of knowledge through causes, the syllogism is a peculiarly

<sup>11</sup> "Concerning the Ontological Status of Logical Forms," soon to be published in the *Review of Metaphysics*.

adapted intention. For as the passage from Aristotle which we have already quoted shows, to come to know a conclusion through a middle is our human means of coming to know a fact through its cause.

Nevertheless, in this present paper it is not our purpose to carry any further this exposition of the realistically oriented intentionality of the Aristotelian syllogism.<sup>12</sup> Rather we should now like to turn our attention to a difficulty which one is likely to experience with a doctrine such as this, even as it has thus far been expounded. For the contemporary reader, even though he might be at least initially sympathetic to the idea of a logic conceived as the natural organon of philosophical realism, would nevertheless be altogether dubious about the claims of the old syllogistic logic to be such an organon.

Indeed, he would probably insist that however abstruse and even irrelevant the subtle apriorism of modern mathematical logic might seem to have become, still there is one lesson that mathematical logic has taught us which cannot well be gainsaid—that is, that the traditional Aristotelian assumption as to the supremacy of the syllogism is no longer defensible. And the reason it is indefensible is that there have now been shown to be innumerable forms and patterns of inference, of which the syllogism is only one, and a comparatively insignificant one at that.

For instance, consider the propositional calculus. Professor Tarski has remarked that "almost all reasonings in any scientific domain are based explicitly or implicitly upon laws of the sentential calculus."<sup>13</sup> And yet these laws or theorems are almost none of them syllogistic in character. In other words, for sheer massiveness alone, there would scarcely seem any more telling evidence of the utter inadequacy of syllogistic logic than the propositional calculus itself. Every one of its theorems may be regarded as a possible "validating form of inference," and yet almost none of its theorems are syllogisms. Accordingly, for the rest of this present study, we should like to scrutinize quite closely this particular line of attack on the adequacy of the syllogism.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> This must not be interpreted as meaning that further exposition is neither necessary nor important. Quite the contrary; the crying need in philosophy today would seem to be for a revived account of causation in the philosophy of nature, and for a revived account in logic of the syllogism as an instrument directly oriented toward the knowledge of such real causal structures in nature. For a suggestive introductory essay in this direction, see the paper read by Professor John Wild before the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association entitled "A Realistic Defense of Causal Efficacy."

<sup>13</sup> A. Tarski, *Introduction to Logic* (2d ed.; New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1941), p. 44.

<sup>14</sup> This must not be taken to mean, of course, that the mathematical logicians have not attacked the supremacy of the syllogism on other grounds and in

To begin with, we may doubtless take it for granted that the basic structure and pattern of development of such propositional calculi are more or less familiar and generally accepted. Thus they all start from the fundamental presupposition that propositions are susceptible of certain types of connection one with another. They may be conjoined with, or disjoined from, one another; they may be negated; they may be made to imply one another, and so on. Moreover, given such fundamental types of propositional connection, it then becomes possible to construct definitions, and from the definitions to develop a whole host of theorems, representing nothing but the derivative properties that are consequent upon the original kinds of propositional connection as so defined and understood.

For instance, as typical theorems, one might consider the following:

$$p \cdot q \supseteq q \cdot p$$

$$p \vee q \vee r \supseteq p \vee q \vee r$$

$$p \vee p \supseteq p$$

$$p \supseteq q \supseteq \sim q \supseteq \sim p$$

Nor is it hard to see how such theorems can function as validating forms of inference. Thus one might as an illustration<sup>15</sup> take the last of these theorems and substitute for  $p$  the expression " $x$  is a positive number" and for  $q$ , " $2x$  is a positive number." Accordingly, from the statement "If  $x$  is a positive number, then  $2x$  is a positive number," one can infer that if  $2x$  is not a positive number, then  $x$  is not a positive number. In other words, the inference is based on the validating form  $p \supseteq q \supseteq \sim q \supseteq \sim p$ .

Here, then, in the propositional calculus one would seem to be provided with a most effective rebuttal of any and every Aristotelian claim that the syllogism is, after all, the unique human instrument of proof and demonstration. Indeed, what is there that an Aristotelian logician could possibly say by way of rejoinder? For surely he could not deny that propositions are susceptible of conjunction, negation, disjunction, implication, and so on. And recognizing this much, how could he deny the theorems that are derived from them? But as for the theorems, what are they but so many validating forms of inference?

Nevertheless, the Aristotelian answer would presumably take the form of a reminder once again of the radically intentional character

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other contexts as well—e.g., in the context of the calculus of classes or in that of the general theory of relations. Nevertheless, in an earlier paper ("Aristotelian Logic and Mathematical Logic: An Essay in Comparison and Appraisal," soon to be published in the *Thomist*) we have discussed at some length the attempt to treat the syllogism as a part of the calculus of classes. Also we are currently working on a paper criticizing the view that the syllogism may be understood as merely exemplifying the relation of transitivity and hence as fitting into the general theory of relations.

<sup>15</sup> The illustration is Tarski's (*op. cit.*, pp. 43-46).

of a realistic logic such as Aristotle's. For once this character of intentionality is brought clearly into focus, it should not be hard to see how an Aristotelian can perfectly well accept such modes of propositional connection as conjunction, disjunction, implication, and so on, and can also accept the whole of the propositional calculus<sup>16</sup> that is erected upon this foundation, and yet in no wise be committed to a recognition of the theorems of the calculus as being all of them validating forms of inference in the same sense in which the syllogism is.

But to support this contention, let us begin by applying the criterion of intentional adequacy to those various modes of propositional connection from which the whole propositional calculus takes its origin. For what do such things as implication, conjunction, and so on, mean?

Nor is such a question to be understood in the way in which the mathematical logicians have accustomed us to understand such questions. For presupposing, as they do, the absolute a priori self-sufficiency of logic, the mathematical logicians consider that the import of all questions as to the meaning of implication or conjunction or what not, is exhausted as soon as one gives a definition of any one such type of propositional connection in terms simply of other types. Thus implication may be defined in terms of conjunction and negation,  $\sim(p \cdot \sim q)$ . Or conjunction may be defined through negation and disjunction,  $\sim(\sim p \vee \sim q)$ . And so on.

And yet this assumption that logical entities can only mean other logical entities completely disregards the peculiar intentionality of things like disjunction, implication, and so on. For so far from just meaning each other, as if they were somehow trying to survive merely by taking

<sup>16</sup> This rather sweeping statement doubtless needs explanation along at least two different lines.

In the first place, in the Aristotelian tradition proper, so far as we know, it has been customary to confine the so-called "immediate inferences" simply to categorical propositions. Nevertheless, we see no reason why hypothetical propositions might not likewise have obverses, contrapositives, converses, etc. (This is a point which we have developed at somewhat greater length in the paper referred to in note 14 above.) Accordingly, once hypothetical propositions are recognized as being susceptible of such immediate inferences, then from the Aristotelian point of view most of the theorems of the propositional calculus are to be understood as nothing more than examples of possible immediate inferences in the sphere of hypothetical, in contrast to mere categorical, propositions.

In the second place, to say that an Aristotelian can perfectly well accept the whole of the propositional calculus is misleading, simply because, as should become apparent from the remainder of our argument, this acceptance is contingent upon a rather radical reinterpretation of the whole nature and character of this calculus.

in one another's washing,<sup>17</sup> these intentional beings are formal signs:<sup>18</sup> their whole nature and being is simply the signifying of, or the tending toward, things other than themselves. Accordingly, any question as to what second intentional beings such as propositions, conjunctions, or what not, mean or intend is a question as to what it is in reality that such logical tools are adapted to disclose.<sup>19</sup>

Accordingly, approaching the question of the meaning of propositional connections from this so-called intentional point of view, we may note at the very outset that all of the various kinds of propositional connection are either reducible to, or at least based upon, two types of connection that are fundamental and prior to all the rest. These two types are respectively the implicative or sequential type and the conjunctive type. In other words, given two propositions that are connected, one can readily see that their connection must either be of a sort such that the one follows upon or is implied by the other, or of the sort that the one is merely linked with the other, but without in any sense being dependent on the other.<sup>20</sup>

Moreover, if any connection between propositions must ultimately be of one of these two types, the implicative or the conjunctive, one can readily recognize the obvious intentionality of all such types of connection. Thus that one proposition should follow from, or be consequent upon, another would seem to signify or intend nothing other than a situation *in rerum natura* where the real fact signified by the one proposition is in some way or other causally connected with the real fact signified by the other.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>17</sup> For further remarks on this idealistic view of meaning and on the contrast between it and the realistic view of meaning of the Aristotelian tradition, cf. our study entitled, "The Significance of the Doctrine of *Suppositio* for an Existential Logic," soon to be published in the *Thomist*.

<sup>18</sup> On the precise meaning of "formal sign" see the article by John Wild entitled "An Introduction to the Phenomenology of Signs," in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* for December, 1947 (p. 232). For a fuller treatment, see John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Philosophicus*, Log. II, 22, 1.

<sup>19</sup> This particular thesis regarding the meaning of logical entities in a realistic logic we have tried to develop somewhat further in the paper referred to in n. 11 above.

<sup>20</sup> For a more detailed justification of this contention that all types of propositional connection presuppose, and are reducible to, these two fundamental types, cf. our study on "Aristotelian Logic and Mathematical Logic," referred to in n. 14, above.

<sup>21</sup> This is not to imply, of course, that the logical order of prior and posterior propositions is always the same as the real order of prior and posterior in the cause and effect that are intended by those propositions. Thus the Scholastics were careful to point out that a syllogistic argument might be either a priori or a posteriori. (N.B.: These terms are not here to be taken in their current, Kantian sense.)

On the other hand, as regards the intentionality of conjunction, we readily recognize that just as it is possible for real facts or events to be causally dependent on one another, so also it often happens that certain real occurrences have no causal connection with one another at all. In the latter case, the mere conjoining of two or more propositions through the copula "and" would seem to be the logical intention that was peculiarly adapted to disclose just such an accidental or contingent togetherness of real things *in rerum natura*.

Moreover, if it be through their causes that one comes to understand things, then clearly the logical instrument of such understanding will be an implicative or sequential connection between propositions. Further, we have already seen how to know a thing through its cause is, so far as the logical instruments of such a knowledge are concerned, to demonstrate a proposition through a middle term. Accordingly, what we have termed an implicative connection between propositions turns out to be nothing more nor less than a syllogism.<sup>22</sup>

Of course, it seems never to have occurred to the mathematical logicians, when they were constructing their calculi, that their  $p \supset q$  really involves a syllogistic connection between propositions. Or if it did occur to them, then they very quickly blotted out all consciousness of it by insisting upon the truth-functional interpretation of all propositional compounds. For such truth-functional interpretation has the effect of simply displacing all implicative or sequential connections between propositions in favor of mere conjunctive connections.<sup>23</sup> But with implication thus excluded from logic, it is little wonder that

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<sup>22</sup> In that same earlier paper of ours that we have already referred to (n. 14, above), we have tried to present the details that would support this blunt assertion that any implicative propositional compound, whether it be conditional, causal, or what not, either is a syllogism itself or at least involves a syllogistic connection of the propositions so compounded.

For another assertion of the same thesis as to the syllogistic character of implications, cf. the paper of John Wild's already referred to (n. 12, above).

<sup>23</sup> This must not be interpreted as meaning that on our view mathematical logicians have simply confused implication, as signified by the horseshoe, with conjunction, as signified by the dot. Quite the contrary, as is well known, implication in this sense is never defined in terms of conjunction alone, but rather in terms of conjunction and denial.

Rather by a "conjunctive connection" of propositions we mean something broader than mere conjunction as signified by the dot. Instead, any connection or combination of propositions that may be interpreted truth-functionally would constitute a mere conjunctive connection, in our sense of the term, in contrast to an implicative or sequential connection.

In many ways it would seem to us that our distinction between implicative and conjunctive connections parallels Reichenbach's distinction between adjunctive and connective operations. Cf. his *Elements of Symbolic Logic* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1947), pp. 28-31.

logic should no longer have been considered to have any real relevance to men's efforts to understand things through their causes. And if knowledge through causes is a thing that logic has no real bearing upon, then quite obviously the syllogism will no longer be thought to be of any special importance within the field of logic.

To be sure, the sort of *succès de scandale* which the truth-functional interpretation of propositional connections has enjoyed during the last several years would appear to have been a source of no little embarrassment even to the mathematical logicians. Some have been frankly apologetic. Some have been content to use bluff and bluster—"Scientists have the right to construct their own simplified concepts."<sup>24</sup> Some have resorted to what would seem to the uninitiated laymen to be little better than a dodge, however ingeniously it may have been covered up by elaborate technical terminology and manipulations.<sup>25</sup> And some, like Professor Lewis, would seem to have responded to the whole challenge by a most astonishing tour de force—the calculus of strict implication.

However, Professor Sheffer is reported recently to have put the matter quite bluntly to his classes, "Of course, nobody knows what implication means." Still, the juster course would appear to be not to accuse the mathematical logicians of ignorance, so much as of a veritable passion for apriorism, as a result of which the traditional concern for intentional adequacy would seem to have disappeared from logic, and with it the understanding of the true character and function of implication.

But be all this as it may, our original thesis as to the primacy of the syllogism must still seem to have been inadequately sustained. For however plausible our contention may be that there are implicative connections between propositions, that these connections are adapted for the intention of causal patterns in reality, and that the logical presupposition of any such implication is always the mediation between two terms by a third—however plausible all this may be, it still leaves untouched the main objection that the propositional calculus does exhibit innumerable validating forms of inference and that, as a consequence, the claims to supremacy on the part of the syllogism are simply baseless.

Thus, for instance,  $p \vee q \supset q \vee p$  is certainly an implication. And yet how by any stretch of the imagination could it be considered to be the intention of any sort of real cause and effect? Moreover, the

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Reichenbach, *op. cit.*, p. 30 (italics mine).

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Quine, *op. cit.*, Sec. 5.

same question would seem to be of equal pertinence with respect to any number of other theorems in the calculus.

Accordingly, addressing ourselves to this objection, let us first try to expose a certain very serious ambiguity that is concealed behind the single propositional function  $p \supset q$ . Thus consider the difference in the two implications that are presented in each of the following sets of examples:

If towels possess a capillary structure, then they are absorbent.  
If towels are absorbent, then they are not nonabsorbent.

Or again:

Since<sup>26</sup> the opposite interior angles of intersecting straight lines have the same supplementary angle in common, they are equal.  
Since the opposite interior angles are equal, they are not nonequal.

Or:

When a civilization suffers a loss of self-determination, it fails to grow.

When a civilization suffers a loss of self-determination, it does not suffer anything other than a loss of self-determination.

Now clearly, in each of these sets of examples the first statement involves an attempted explanation of something through one of its causes, whereas the second seems to involve a mere saying of the same thing over again in a different way. Or to use an old-fashioned, and far from felicitous, logical terminology, the first statement in each instance might be said to involve a mediate or syllogistic inference, whereas the second involves only an immediate inference.

Of course, we are quite ready to recognize that this distinction between mediate and immediate inferences must appear as a strange anachronism in the context of modern logic.<sup>27</sup> Not only that, but we are also ready to grant, at least for purposes of argument, that the usual criteria for distinguishing between such types of inference—for instance that the one involves an inference leading to "new knowledge," whereas the other does not—may be awkward, misleading,

<sup>26</sup> The use of causal propositions, instead of conditionals, in this second set of examples was deliberate. For while conditionals differ from causals in that they are merely hypothetical, they are both alike in being instances of the implicative, rather than the conjunctive, type of propositional connection. For this reason our insistence upon the syllogistic character of all implications is pertinent to both causal and conditional propositions.

We have developed this point at some length in our paper, "Aristotelian Logic and Mathematical Logic" (cf. n. 14, above).

<sup>27</sup> Cf. the pronouncements in this regard of Cohen and Nagel, *An Introduction to Logic* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1934), p. 73.

and perhaps not fundamental. And yet be all that as it may, we still must declare roundly that there is a radical distinction, call it what you will, between a proposition such as:

If towels have a capillary structure, they are absorbent.  
and a proposition such as:

If towels necessarily have a capillary structure, then anything that does not possess such a structure is not a towel.

Moreover, the way we should like to point up the nature of this distinction is in terms of the difference between first and second intentions.<sup>28</sup> For it is only when a proposition such as "Towels have a capillary structure" is taken in first intention that we are able to conclude from it, "Towels are absorbent." On the other hand, when one considers not the nature of the things signified by the proposition, but just the nature of the proposition as such—that is, when one takes the proposition in second intention—then one can conclude from it no more than a proposition of some such type as, "Anything not possessed of a capillary structure is not a towel," is

In short, the distinction between the two types of inference, the mediate and the immediate, would seem to turn on the distinction between drawing a conclusion about the real things (*entia*) intended by a proposition, and drawing a conclusion about the intention or proposition itself (*ens rationis*). Thus in the foregoing example the conclusion as to the towels' being absorbent is a conclusion as to the nature or *being* of towels; and it is a conclusion drawn from still another fact about the *being* of towels. On the other hand, the conclusion, "Anything not possessed of a capillary structure is not a towel," is not so much a conclusion about the nature or being of any real thing (*ens*), as it is an alternative intention or propositional formulation (*ens rationis*) of the same real fact that one has already intended in another proposition.

To be sure, this must not be interpreted to mean that the contrapositive, or any other proposition immediately inferred from another proposition, can have no first intention or signify anything real. On the contrary, "Anything not possessed of a capillary structure is not a towel" does express a truth about the real things denominated by the

<sup>28</sup> We must consider that this ancient Scholastic distinction is sufficiently well known so as not to need any special explanation here. It of course is a distinction having many points in common with various modern distinctions, e.g., Quine's distinction between a proposition and the name of a proposition (*op. cit.*, pp. 27-28), or Reichenbach's distinction between *object language* and *metalanguage* (*op. cit.*, pp. 9-15).

We have made extensive use of this same distinction between first and second intentions in all of our other papers (cf. nn. 11, 14, and 17, above).

subject. And yet while this is true of the immediately inferred proposition taken in itself, still, when such a proposition is regarded precisely as a conclusion immediately inferred from another proposition, one is then clearly taking it as an object of second intention. For what is actually concluded in such an immediate inference is, as we have seen, not that a certain real thing has a certain real attribute, but rather that a certain proposition is an alternative way of expressing the same truth already expressed in the preceding proposition.

Now such considerations, we hope, may have served to make somewhat clearer the nature of the ambiguity which we originally attributed to the function  $p \supset q$ . For if our illustrations have been pertinent and rightly interpreted, it would appear that sometimes when we insert concrete propositions as values of the variables in  $p \supset q$  we understand these propositions in first intention, and then at other times we take them in second intention. Moreover, if the propositions are taken in first intention, then what we have is an implication of the sort we have already discussed: the intention of such an implication is some real causal pattern *in rerum natura*, and the logical structure of such an implication is the mediation between two terms by a third, or the categorical syllogism. On the other hand, if the propositions be taken in second intention, then the implication involves no more than a so-called immediate inference: the second or consequent proposition representing not a conclusion about reality, but only an alternative way of formulating the same truth signified by the first or antecedent proposition.

Accordingly, coming back to the theorems of the propositional calculus, one cannot but be struck by the fact that the so-called major implications or equivalences<sup>29</sup> which are presented in these theorems are almost without exception of the type of the immediate rather than the mediate inferences. Thus suppose we add a few more examples to our earlier list:

$$\begin{aligned} p \supset q \vee p \supset r &: p \supset q \vee r \\ p \supset q \supset \sim p \vee q & \\ p \vee q, r \supset p \supset q \vee r & \\ p \vee q \supset q \vee p & \end{aligned}$$

In each of these cases, just as in each of those previously cited, it is easy to see that the consequent (or equivalent) proposition does no more than restate the same truth already stated in the antecedent. Or to put the matter in somewhat more accurate technical language:

<sup>29</sup> That is to say, "major" implications or equivalences, in contrast to such implications and equivalences as may enter into theorems as mere subordinate or component parts. The expression "major" is Reichenbach's (*op. cit.*, p. 26).

considered as objects of second intention, the antecedent and consequent are different propositions; but taken in first intention, the antecedent and consequent mean or intend the same thing.

But now, if this conclusion is correct, what becomes of that earlier challenge to Aristotelian logic—the challenge, namely, that the propositional calculus provides innumerable validating forms of inference that are at once alternative to, and irreducible to, the syllogism? Well, apparently, these validating forms would, most of them at least,<sup>30</sup> seem not to be alternative to the syllogism at all. For they represent nothing more nor less than types or patterns for immediate inference, whereas the syllogism involves mediate inference. In other words, if one wants to demonstrate something about real things, one must use the syllogism, whereas if one wants merely to exhibit various ways of saying the same thing, then one can resort to the “validating forms” of the propositional calculus.

And yet even this will not do. For on more careful analysis, we think that it will turn out that even the demonstration of these mere alternative ways of saying the same thing is really not independent of the syllogism. For when scrutinized more closely, what our argument thus far developed would really seem to point to is not so much a difference in two kinds or types of implication, but rather a difference in two kinds of object upon which the propositional relation of implication might be said to have bearing. Thus in the one case the implication intends objects of first intention;<sup>31</sup> in the other case, objects of second intention. For instance, in the proposition “If towels have a capillary structure, they are absorbent,” it is in virtue of a presumed causal relation in things that one is able to draw the conclusion represented in the consequent. On the other hand, in the proposition “If towels are absorbent, they are not other than absorbent,” it is because of the supposed nature of the proposition, *qua* proposition, that is, *qua* object of second intention, that one is able to conclude to the consequent.

Or, to change our illustration somewhat, we may say that in the theorem  $p \supset q, p \cdot \sim q \supset \sim p$  it of course makes no difference what the natures of those things are that are intended by  $p$  and  $q$  in first intention:

<sup>30</sup> As to what the exceptions are, we shall have more to say about these later (cf. below, p. 201 and n. 38).

<sup>31</sup> It will appear as our argument proceeds that this statement of the contrast is not quite accurate: strictly speaking, the distinction turns not so much on the difference between intending objects of first intention and intending objects of second intention, but rather on the difference between intending the *objects* of one's intention (whether objects of first or second intention) and intending those very *intentions* themselves. Cf. above, p. 195.

the major implication holds regardless of what the  $p$  and the  $q$  may happen to mean or intend. On the other hand, it does make a decided difference, so far as the major implication is concerned, what the  $\supset$  may mean or signify. For what this theorem is about is a particular propositional relation, called "implication" and symbolized by  $\supset$ ; in fact, the theorem really expresses a property of that second intentional being called "implication." In other words, it is only in virtue of the *nature*,<sup>32</sup> not of a real being, but rather of a being of reason, that the consequent follows in this particular theorem.

Accordingly, the ambiguity that we formerly spoke of in the propositional function  $p \supset q$  now turns out to be something like this. In the one case the  $p$  and the  $q$  stand for propositions taken in first intention, and the implication intends a causal pattern in real things (that is, in objects of first intention); in the other case the  $p$  and the  $q$  stand for propositions taken in second intention, and the implication intends a causal pattern<sup>33</sup> in mere logical entities or beings of reason. That is to say, in the latter case it is *because* of the nature of implication (a being of reason or object of second intention) that  $\sim q \supset \sim p$  follows as a property of such implication.

But now if implication always signifies or intends a certain causal order or pattern, and if the intention of causal order always involves a syllogistic ordering of the intending propositions, then presumably it should make no difference whether the intention of the implication be aimed at a causal order among objects of first intention or at a causal order among objects of second intention—in either case the implicative connection between the intending propositions should be syllogistic in character. And so in fact it would seem to be in the case of the major implicative connections that appear in the various theorems of the propositional calculus. Thus why is it, one might ask, that  $\sim q \supset \sim p$  is but another way of expressing the same

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<sup>32</sup> Strictly speaking, a mere being of reason does not have a nature or essence. However, the scope of this term is sometimes extended by analogy so as to include even logical entities.

<sup>33</sup> The notion of "cause", has become subject to such oversimplifications in modern philosophy that its use in this context may appear strange indeed. However, the notion of property and of the causal dependence of a property on a nature or essence may not be so wholly remote from present-day thinking as to rule out all understanding of what we mean by cause in this connection. Nevertheless, a really adequate account of logical implication certainly does presuppose a right understanding of the nature and character of causes: since the whole being of the former is simply adapted to the intention of the latter, any understanding of the former is certainly dependent upon an understanding of the sort of thing it is designed to signify or intend.

truth expressed by  $p \supset q$ ? The answer is that it is but another way of expressing  $\sim(p \cdot \sim q)$ , and  $\sim(p \cdot \sim q)$  is but another way of expressing  $p \supset q$ .

Moreover, this same conclusion is borne out if we consider not the specific means of proving  $p \supset q \supset \sim q \supset \sim p$ , but the general means of proving any and every such theorem. For as is well known, the mathematical logicians have been careful to distinguish between the theorems or validating forms of inference within the propositional calculus itself and the rules of proof or derivation by means of which these theorems or validating forms are themselves demonstrated or derived. Now, of these so-called rules of proof the principal ones are the *modus ponens* rule and the rule of substitution.

But interestingly enough, no sooner does one analyze these rules than one can see that what they prescribe is nothing more nor less than a syllogistic mode of demonstration.<sup>34</sup> Thus, as regards the rule of substitution, it would seem to turn on nothing other than the principle of the *dictum de omni et nullo*. And as regards the *modus ponens* rule, it may be noted first that any conditional proposition, involving as it does an implicative or sequential connection between its component propositions, really presupposes a tentative syllogistic mediation between two extreme terms by a third. Further, since in any *modus ponens* the antecedent of the original proposition is asserted categorically, the hypothetical and tentative character of this original presupposed syllogism is removed when the antecedent is posited. In consequence, the positing of the antecedent is in effect a positing of the whole categorical syllogism.<sup>35</sup>

But now, in the light of such considerations, it should begin to appear more clearly just what the distinctive character of syllogistic inference is, and how such a form of inference differs radically and irreducibly from all of the so-called validating forms of inference that are non-syllogistic. For the conclusion of a syllogism is never a conclusion about its own *premises* just as such; rather, it is a conclusion about the *objects intended* by those premises. On the other hand, in the non-syllogistic inferences, the inference, if it may be called such, is not an inference about the objects intended by the component propositions, but simply an inference pertaining to those intentions themselves.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>34</sup> This point we have tried to defend at some length in the article referred to in n. 14, above.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. *ibid.* for a more detailed account of this interpretation of the *modus ponens* operation.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. n. 31, above.

This we first sought to illustrate through examples in which the objects intended were obviously objects of first intention. Thus in the proposition "If towels have a capillary structure, they are absorbent," the inference suggested by this implication was obviously an inference about towels (that is, about the objects intended in the component propositions). On the other hand, in the implication "If towels have capillary structure, then anything not having such a structure is not a towel," the inference was significant not as disclosing anything about the nature of towels, but simply as exhibiting in the consequent an alternative propositional formulation of the same truth already expressed in the antecedent.

Moreover, on further investigation we found that just as the syllogism was the only form of inference that was adapted to demonstrating a conclusion about objects of first intention, so also it turned out to be the only way of proving a conclusion about objects of second intention. In other words, as soon as one considers a proposition such as "Towels have a capillary structure" precisely as a proposition and as an object of second intention, and as soon as one asks whether it be a property of such an "All S is P" proposition to be expressible in the form "No non-P is S," the only way that one can answer such a question is through a syllogistic demonstration.

Or better, to use the actual example which we ourselves used earlier, take the formula  $p \supset q, p \supset q \sim q \supset \sim p$ . Here the consequent represents a conclusion, not about the *objects intended* by the *p*'s and *q*'s, but rather about the *intention* or proposition  $p \supset q$  itself. That is to say, the consequent simply states a property of the relation of implication as such. However, if one wishes to know whether  $\sim q \supset \sim p$  really is a property of  $p \supset q$ , then, as we tried to show, the demonstration of such a property of implication can only be by a syllogism.

In other words, it is the hallmark of the syllogism that whether its intended objects be objects of first intention or objects of second intention, the conclusion of the syllogism is always a conclusion about these intended objects, and never about its own intentions of these objects.<sup>37</sup> And reciprocally, in any argument or implicative proposition in which the conclusion or consequent is a conclusion about the objects intended, then such an argument or implication is *eo ipso* syllogistic.

Of course, it almost goes without saying that the propositional calculus with its disregard of intentionality and its preoccupation with formal truth or analytic truth or tautology, or whatever one may wish to call it, should have quite blurred the distinctive character of syllogistic

<sup>37</sup> Cf. n. 31, above.

inference. Thus, as is well known, so far as the calculus is concerned, a theorem such as  $p \supset q \cdot \sim q \supset \sim p$  is held to be quite on a par with, and to be of the same general character as, a theorem such as  $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r \cdot \sim p \supset r$ .<sup>38</sup> Nor can it be denied that both of them are alike tautological and formally true, and so forth, in the sense that is usually given to such expressions.

And yet one has only to consider these two theorems with reference to their intentionality to see how radically different the one is from the other. Thus in the case of  $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r \cdot \sim p \supset r$  one has only to ask oneself: Does the consequent,  $\sim p \supset r$ , represent a conclusion about the antecedent considered just as such and as an object of second intention; or does it represent a conclusion about the things or objects intended by the antecedent? Clearly, it is the latter and not the former.

On the other hand, so far as  $p \supset q \cdot \sim q \supset \sim p$  is concerned, we have already seen how the consequent in this case represents a conclusion not about the objects intended by the  $p$ 's and  $q$ 's, but rather about the proposition or intention,  $p \supset q$ , itself.<sup>39</sup>

Nor would there be much point to the possible rejoinder that both  $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r \cdot \sim p \supset r$  and  $p \supset q \cdot \sim q \supset \sim p$  hold for "all possible values" of  $p$  and  $q$  and  $r$ , and that hence there could be no distinction between them on the ground of intentionality. No; for while the antecedent is correct, the consequent simply does not follow. Thus it is perfectly true that both theorems hold for all possible values of their variables. And yet the question still remains as to how these possible propositional values of the variables are to be taken—in first intention or in second intention? And once this question is squarely faced, one will perhaps begin to see the crucial difference between such so-called "validating forms of inference" as might be termed syllogistic and all the others that might be termed nonsyllogistic.

<sup>38</sup> Here is an instance of what we shall choose to call a syllogistic validating form of inference, as over against the nonsyllogistic forms which are the common ones in the propositional calculus (cf. above, p. 192 and n. 30).

Indeed in our earlier paper referred to in n. 14, above, we attempted to go through the list of the commoner theorems of the calculus and point out the occasional syllogistic validating forms that are to be found among them. We then went on to try to show how these syllogistic validating forms are not properly a part of the propositional calculus at all. Indeed, when properly understood, a form such as  $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r \cdot \sim p \supset r$  cannot be deducted from other theorems and postulates, but must simply be introduced as a postulate itself.

<sup>39</sup> The contrast which we are trying to draw between these two theorems might perhaps be much more clearly exhibited in the following examples:

$$p \supset q \cdot q \supset r \cdot \sim p \supset r$$

$$p \supset q \cdot q \supset r \cdot q \supset r \cdot \sim p \supset q$$

The difference in intentionality would here seem to be quite striking.

Of the former, it may be said that even though for the truth of such a validating form it makes no difference what the component propositions (or terms) may happen to signify or intend, still the consequent in such a form always represents a conclusion that is about the objects meant or intended, whatever they may be, and not about the intentions themselves. On the other hand, in the nonsyllogistic forms, while again it makes no difference to the truth of the validating form as a whole what its component propositions (or terms) may mean or intend, still the conclusion in these forms is not a conclusion about these objects meant or intended, but rather about the intentions themselves considered precisely as such.

In brief, it is the syllogistic forms of inference, and they alone, which lead us to conclusions about the objects of our intentions. In consequence, it is they and they alone which we must rely upon if we are ever to attain a realistic knowledge of things in and through their causes.

# THE NATURE AND GENESIS OF THE SKEPTIC ATTITUDE

VENANT CAUCHY

The history of philosophy offers us an interesting field in which to observe the workings and development of the human mind. Nowhere does this hold more truly than in the radical forms of thought which compel man by sheer force of logic to contradict facts as a result of an uncritical acceptance of pseudo-evidences.

A clear example of this is found in the skepticism of Sextus Empiricus. If we represented the entire history of philosophy by a straight line, skepticism would constitute one end and realism the other, with all the intervening systems attempting an impossible compromise between the two attitudes, some nearer, some further from one or the other, but ever failing in their hopeless ventures.

An objective study of the skeptic attitude in its most logical exponent, Sextus Empiricus, sheds light on the doctrines which fall short of realism. We observe there the difficulties which must be overcome in order to obtain a true knowledge of reality and the numerous bypaths which lead away from truth. We come to realize that the greatest danger to realism lies in realists themselves, in their shallow understanding of their own system, their sense of inferiority in the face of a hostile world, and their lack of confidence in the perpetual originality of the mind.

## DEFINITION OF THE SKEPTIC ATTITUDE

The first book of the *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* presents a thorough description of the Pyrrhonian attitude. Sextus distinguishes Pyrrhonism from all the other systems which have arisen in the development of thought. Human search for truth, our writer contends, may achieve

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three possible results: either one attains the objects of the investigation, or one concludes to the impossibility of ever knowing truth, or lastly one continues in endless search. All brands of dogmatists fall under the first category; they devise theories which are presented as certain knowledge of reality. The Academy, with Carneades and Clitomachos, teaches, however, that the mind can never attain the object of its investigation. The skeptics alone keep on searching without giving in to dogmatic rashness or Academic prejudice.<sup>1</sup>

Thus Sextus really distinguishes two types of dogmatism. The first affirms the possibility of knowing reality with certitude; its numerous adherents are called Stoics, Epicureans, Peripatetics, to mention only the main schools of the Roman Empire. The other type of dogmatism masquerades as a form of skepticism; it denies the possibility of knowing reality, and as such cannot be more than a negative dogmatism. Skepticism stands out against these two extremes. Skeptics refrain from affirming anything whatsoever: even the expressions or the words they use serve as false fronts which they would gladly destroy along with the dogmatic systems.

Throughout his works, Sextus aims at defining skepticism in such a way as to distinguish it from all dogmatic tendencies. Let us consider for the moment the definition proposed in the first book of the *Outlines*:

Skepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgements in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and next to a state of "unperturbedness" or quietude.<sup>2</sup>

Sextus goes on to explain the different parts of his definition.<sup>3</sup> He warns against taking the word "ability" in a subtle sense; there is no need to stretch its meaning. Skepticism is primarily an ability, a tendency, a power of the mind. By the word φαινόμενα or "appearances," our skeptic designates the sensible qualities (*αἰσθητά*) as

<sup>1</sup> "The natural result of any investigation is that the investigators discover the object of search or deny that it is discoverable or persist in their search" (*Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, i, 1; Vol. I of *Sextus Empiricus*, trans. R. G. Bury ["Loeb Classical Library"; 3 vols.; Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press], p. 3). Sextus goes on to show the rashness of the first two attitudes and the superiority of the third. (Permission to use quotations from *Sextus Empiricus* has kindly been granted by the publisher.)

<sup>2</sup> "Ἐστι δὲ ἡ σκεπτικὴ δύναμις ἀντιθετικὴ φαινομένων τε καὶ νοομένων καθ' ολονδήποτε τρόπον, ἀφ' ἣς ἐρχομένα διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις πράγμασι καὶ λόγοις ἴσοσθένειαν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς ἐποχήν τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς ἀταραξίαν" (*Outlines*, i, 8 [trans. Bury, I, 7]).

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, i, 9-11 (I, 7, 9).

opposed to the intelligible (*νοητά*). The expression "in any way whatsoever" may be related (a) to ability, thus emphasizing the very general meaning of the word; (b) to the opposition between phenomena and noumena<sup>4</sup> (*ἀντιθετικὴ φαινομένων τε καὶ νοούμενῶν*), in order to indicate that the skeptic opposes phenomena and noumena in every conceivable way; (c) or again to *φαινομένων* and *νοούμενῶν* taken as present participles. In the latter case the skeptic manifests a complete indifference in the choice of phenomena and noumena: he accepts everything that comes to him and for this reason may dispense with the useless work involved in determining a theory of cognition. Sextus emphasizes this atmosphere of indefiniteness by his explanation of the expression *ἀντικειμένοις πράγμασι καὶ λόγοις*. By "opposed," he does not only mean the opposition existing between affirmation and negation, but any incompatibility between propositions. Skepticism is a militant attitude; it does not adopt a position, but must constantly be on guard to ridicule and destroy the dogmas of its adversaries. The skeptic attitude has no claim to objectivity; on the contrary, it is entirely enclosed in the subject. Theoretically the skeptic never leaves his shell, even if he seems at times to take a dogmatic stand in order to pull apart the dogmas of his enemies. "Equipollence," or *ἴσοσθένεια* ("equal value of opposed theses"), affirms Sextus, does not imply a factual equality between propositions, but expresses the bewilderment of the mind faced with conflicting arguments of equal force. This equality, Sextus tells us, does not imply a contact with things, but merely results from a subjective process (*κατὰ πίστιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν*). Suspension of judgment (*ἐποχή*), which follows upon equipollence, is defined as a state of mind according to which the skeptic neither denies nor affirms anything. Quietude (*ἀταραξία*) is the serenity and peace of mind which result from suspension of judgment. As we shall see later, autosuggestion plays an important part in the formation of the skeptic attitude; the skeptic strives with all his heart to achieve suspension of judgment and the tranquillity which follows upon it, in much the same way as the sages of India yearn for their identification with the supreme and impersonal Self.

### SKEPTICISM AS AN ATTITUDE

The skeptic, as we may conclude from a study of his phenomenism, does not claim to know the nature of things. The unstable phenomena which come from without cannot serve as a basis for speculative assent.

<sup>4</sup> The use of "noumena" to translate *νοούμενα*, does not imply a *rapprochement* between Kant and Sextus. Kant merely transposes the Greek expression into his own language to give it a definite meaning in the framework of Criticism.

Even the choice of a definite rule of conduct is incompatible with Pyrrhonian doubt; for, in the end, one must always trace it back to some type of speculative affirmation. But if all thought, speculative or practical, is rejected from skepticism, it can be nothing more than an attitude, an orientation of the mind; herein lies one aspect of the basic contradiction of skepticism. No one believes that the skeptic can free himself so easily from all speculation, but nonetheless he would reject from his attitude any speculative implication.<sup>5</sup> He sees himself as the opponent of all who lay claim to a knowledge of reality.

Many texts appear to identify skepticism with the skeptic attitude. In other schools, the attitude affords the general atmosphere, the mental background in which the doctrines are set. But in the Pyrrhonian school, systematic thought is willfully destroyed and nihilism itself seems doomed to a regress ad infinitum which even foregoes the possibility of a purely negative philosophy.

The definition of skepticism gives us precious information concerning the intimate relationship between the skeptic way ( $\delta\gammaωγή$ ) and the attitude. Indeed the word  $\deltaύναμις$ ,<sup>6</sup> which defines skepticism, may be construed as identical with attitude or as flowing directly from it. Skepticism is not a philosophy, but a practical attitude. The skeptic stands out among others in that he inquires constantly without ever attaining the object of his inquiry.<sup>7</sup>

In the definition, the adjective  $\sigmaκεπτική$  does not qualify  $\deltaύναμις$ , but  $\delta\gammaωγή$ , which is the subject of the preceding sentence. But what is the exact meaning of  $\delta\gammaωγή$ , and why should Sextus use it instead of  $\varphiιλοσοφία$  or some other expression? There is a very simple reason: Sextus wishes to shun from the very beginning any word which might present skepticism in the false light of speculative systems. The word  $\delta\gammaωγή$  guards against this danger; it implies action and change. Sextus must have recourse sooner or later to expressions which resemble speculative principles; but we must never forget that he considers these expressions in a context of  $\delta\gammaωγή$ , and thus averts the danger of appearing to dogmatize. We can attach no other meaning to his warning in the opening lines of the *Outlines*.<sup>8</sup> The skeptic expressions represent efforts or attempts to follow a road whose term one can never hope to attain.

This view of skepticism as a mere attitude may be drawn from

<sup>5</sup> Skeptic phenomenalism establishes this speculative nihilism.

<sup>6</sup> See *ibid.*, i, 8 (I, 7).

<sup>7</sup> "... οἱ δὲ ἔτι ζητοῦσιν" (*ibid.*, i, 2 [I, 2]).

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, i, 4 (I, 5).

the outline given by Sextus at the beginning of his skeptic books.<sup>9</sup> The first book, where he thoroughly defines his attitude, is indicated with its main subdivisions (*καθόλου μὲν ἐν τῷ τὸν χαρακτῆρα τῆς σχέψεως ἔκτιθεμεθα*). Although the remainder occupies eight times as much space as the first book of the *Outlines*, Sextus merely refers to it as a special part in which he proposes objections to each section of dogmatic philosophy (*Εἰδικὸς δὲ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἔκαστον μέρος τῆς καλουμένης φιλοσοφίας ἀντιλέγομεν*). In fact the other books (the remainder of the *Outlines*, *Against the Logicians*, *Against the Physicists*, and *Against the Ethicists*) simply make use of the skeptic attitude, as determined in the first book, to destroy the theories of the dogmatists. One will find in these protracted catalogues of objections, valid or sophistical, minor confirmations, but nothing essential to skepticism that has not been set forth in the first book of the *Outlines*. Sextus himself refers to them as commentaries.<sup>10</sup>

We do not deny, of course, the inherent contradiction of an attitude rejecting speculative implications. It is quite another task, however, to explain how and why this came to be. This we will attempt by an intrinsic criticism of the skeptic attitude as defined in the works of Sextus Empiricus.

### DUAL CHARACTER OF THE SKEPTIC ATTITUDE

The skeptic attitude implies a basic duality which we must determine before we can understand the nature of skepticism. At the beginning of his *Outlines*, Sextus shows the thinker bewildered by the confusion prevalent in knowledge; the opposition of the different systems which claim a knowledge of reality increase his perplexity. His difficulties force him to continue his investigation without ever attaining truth. We call this the first phase in the formation of the skeptic attitude. The other phase seems to follow naturally from the permanence of the problems; it is marked by a satisfaction or a crystallization of the mind in instability. The two phases may be found not only in Pyrrhonian skepticism, but in all types of skepticism. Thus, when Cicero speaks of the difficulties encountered in searching for a criterion of truth,<sup>11</sup> he stays in the first phase; he faces a real problem. But no sooner has

<sup>9</sup> See *ibid.*, i, 5-6 (I, 5).

<sup>10</sup> See *ibid.*, i, 222 (I, 135).

<sup>11</sup> "Non enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore dolatus; habet animum, movetur mente, movetur sensibus, ut esse ei vera multa videantur neque tamen habere insignem illam et propriam percipiendi notam, eoque sapientem non adsentiri, quia possit ejusdem modi existere falsum aliquod cuiusmodi hoc verum" (*Academica*, ii, 101).

he enunciated his principle "possit ejusdem modi existere falsum aliquod cuiusmodi hoc verum," than he neglects the difficulty to adopt a position of instability. These two phases in the development of skepticism remain present in the final stage. At this point, they could be designated as the contradictory aspects of the skeptic attitude, but we may still refer to them as the two phases of skepticism in view of their role in the elaboration of the attitude.

#### FIRST PHASE

One may distinguish in Sextus a spontaneous and a crystallized or systematic doubt. The spontaneous, which is characteristic of the first phase, results from the real difficulties encountered in our investigation of the world. We can hardly describe the process of knowledge; we cannot even hope that such a description will ever express adequately the complexity of our operations. Erroneous opinions constantly remind us of our limitations, and, when left without solution, prepare the mind for universal doubt.

We refer to this phase of spontaneous doubt whatever nobility, anguish, or sincere inquiry may be uncovered in the skeptic attitude. The decision to suspend judgment is a consequence of the difficulties which confront the mind; it is not the cause of the attitude considered under its aspect of spontaneity.

For the Sceptic, having set out to philosophize with the object of passing judgement on the sense-impressions and ascertaining which of them are true and which false, so as to attain quietude thereby, found himself involved in contradictions of equal weight, and being unable to decide between them suspended judgement.<sup>12</sup>

At the beginning of the second book of the *Outlines*, Sextus tries to base the skeptic search for truth on a professed ignorance of the nature of things:

For to continue the investigation of problems is not inconsistent in those who confess their ignorance of their real nature, but only in those who believe they have an exact knowledge of them.<sup>13</sup>

The skeptics like to consider their attitude under this aspect of spontaneity. What is more natural, indeed, than to resent the rashness of the solutions proposed by the dogmatists to the most difficult problems? The ridiculous dogmas of many philosophical systems gain nothing but contempt from thinkers seriously preoccupied with knowing the truth, and we find here reason enough to grant the skeptic a certain amount

<sup>12</sup> *Outlines*, i, 26 (I, 19).

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, ii, 11 (I, 157, 159).

of sincerity. This spontaneity appears somewhat in the refutations: the skeptic does not make as much use as he could of the objections advanced in previous refutations. He considers each dogmatic thesis, destroying even the solutions offered by the dogmatists to the skeptic difficulties. Sextus would not have us look upon skepticism as a system of universal negation<sup>14</sup> or relate the negation found in the refutations to an intention derived from his attitude; on the contrary, the skeptic admits the strength of dogmatic arguments; but he does not fail to attribute as much strength to the opposite theses. Skepticism thrives on irreducible oppositions and lack of precision.

The first phase of the attitude appears even in the names attributed to the Pyrrhonians.<sup>15</sup> The word *skeptic* (from σκέπτεσθαι, "to observe," "to reflect") does not imply primarily a systematic rejection of assent, but the thorough examination of facts necessary before adopting a position. The skeptics are also called "zetetics" (Ζητητικοί from ζητεῖν, "to search"), to indicate that they seek the truth, and "aporetics" ('Απορητικοί, from ἀπορεῖν, "to doubt," "to have problems"), because their attitude is a result of the difficulties encountered in the knowledge of reality.<sup>16</sup> The name "ephectics" ('Εφεκτικοί, from ἐπ-έχω, "to retain," "to stop," "to suspend judgment"), however, can hardly be explained in a context of spontaneous doubt. In Sextus's account of this name, we detect the contradiction prevailing between the two phases of the skeptic attitude; after affirming that the skeptic (as opposed to the dogmatists and Academics) searches constantly for truth,<sup>17</sup> he speaks of suspension of judgment as a state of mind which comes after the search.<sup>18</sup>

#### SECOND PHASE

Sooner or later the skeptic achieves a systematic state of mind. In reaction against the immoderate affirmations<sup>19</sup> of the dogmatists, the spontaneous doubt of the first phase slowly develops into a crystallized or systematic doubt.<sup>20</sup> The skeptic, filled with contempt for dogmatic assertions and unable to unravel for himself the problems of knowledge, inclines by contrast to consider his doubt as a value;

<sup>14</sup> See *ibid.*, i, 4 (I, 5).

<sup>15</sup> See *ibid.*, i, 7 (I, 5, 7).

<sup>16</sup> See *ibid.*, i, 12 (I, 9).

<sup>17</sup> See *ibid.*, i, 4 (I, 5).

<sup>18</sup> "... ἐφεκτικὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ μετὰ ζήτησιν . . ." (*ibid.*, i, 7 [I, 4]).

<sup>19</sup> The different forms of προπέτεια ("rashness") as applied to the dogmatists are perhaps the most frequently used words after the different forms of ἐποχή. It is used as an adjective, a noun, an adverb, or a verb. (See *ibid.*, i, 17, 20, 21, 177, 205, 212, 327: ii, 94, etc. [I, 13, 15, 99 and 101, 121, 127, 147, 211].)

<sup>20</sup> Edwyn Bevan, (*Stoics and Sceptics* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913]) emphasizes this point in his treatment of Pyrrho. Cf. p. 124: "Once grasp that

there lies the precise origin and the radical vice of skepticism, its capitulation to self-satisfaction. He looks for tranquillity in the possession of science, but, deterred by supposedly unsolvable difficulties, resorts to suspension of judgment. By a stroke of luck ( $\tauυχικῶς$ ), tranquillity follows upon suspension of judgment.<sup>21</sup> This awareness of skepticism as a value affords a smooth transition from the first phase to the second.

The second phase consists in abandoning in fact the search for truth. The skeptics invent their principle of equipollence, according to which one may oppose to any given thesis a contradictory proposition of equal value.<sup>22</sup> In the first phase, skepticism appears as an evolution in the direction of truth; in the second, it crystallizes in willful suspension of judgment. "Si nihil percipi posset, et esset opinatio turpissima, nihil unquam sapiens approbaret," writes Augustine in his account of Academic skepticism.<sup>23</sup> We must place here an arbitrary intervention of the will, for a state of uncertainty and anguish can never lead of itself to stability in the possession of an end. In the light of this second phase, the systematic nature of the tropes and the dogmatic character of the skeptic principles receive their full import. Skepticism becomes a sort of cynical nihilism railing at and despising all forms of assent. By a gradual process of autosuggestion, the principle of equipollence is substituted for the investigation of truth. Peace of mind, which stimulated inquiry as a distant goal, is found to result unexpectedly from suspension of judgment.<sup>24</sup>

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the desire was essentially futile, that you could let the mind play and hold it back all the while from fixed belief ( $\xi\piοχή$ ), and there was no reason why you should not be perfectly happy and contented in nescience."

<sup>21</sup> See *Outlines*, i, 26-27 (I, 19).

<sup>22</sup> "The main basic principle of the Sceptic system is that of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition . . ." (*ibid.*, i, 12 [I, 9]).

<sup>23</sup> *Contra Academicos*, ii, col. 923, n. 11.

<sup>24</sup> This desertion of truth for the sake of tranquillity could prevail only in times of philosophical and political unrest when peace of mind appeared as the supreme good. Pyrrho teaches in a world disrupted by Alexander's conquest; he comes in direct contact with the Indian sages (Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, ix, 63) whose nirvana is very similar to the skeptic  $\delta\tauρα\tilde{\eta}\lambda$ . He is deeply impressed by the local character of accepted Greek customs and by the fleeting nature of world conditions (Leon Robin, *La Pensée grecque* [Paris: Renaissance du Livre, 1923], p. 325). Sextus himself lives in an era of decadence; the Roman Empire labors under the pressure of the barbarian hordes. The gods are ridiculed by authors such as Lucian, who lived a few decades before Sextus Empiricus (*Dialogues of the Gods, Gods in Council*, etc.). The history of philosophy appears just as confusing as customs and politics; the ancient world is saturated with opposed systems of philosophy which claim the unconditional adherence of their followers.

The skeptic does not *intend* to suspend judgment, but, in the face of innumerable problems, he cannot do otherwise; there is no reason for accepting or refusing one solution rather than another. Unable to distinguish true from false, he abstains from judging; this action brings him the peace of mind he sought as the end of his inquiry.<sup>25</sup> At this point, the second phase makes its appearance. Henceforth this new factor takes its place within the skeptic attitude; instead of trying to find truth in one of two contradictory conclusions, the skeptic strives to show the equal strength of the contradictory arguments. This a priori decision brings him peace of mind. By pronouncing judgment on the goodness or badness of things, writes Sextus, one is exposed to unnecessary disturbances. For if one possesses the good, the mind is disturbed by the fear of losing it; if one does not possess it, the privation causes much sadness. The skeptic, on the contrary, affirms nothing about the natures; he takes things and events as they come and does not pursue goods or flee evils, for he does not claim to know what is good or bad.<sup>26</sup>

Sextus illustrates the formation of the skeptic attitude by a striking example taken from the life of a painter named Apelles.<sup>27</sup> One day, the artist was vainly trying to represent foam around a horse's mouth. Irritated by the inadequacy of his work, he threw a sponge at the painting. The sponge, striking the picture, accomplished what he had been trying in vain to achieve. The skeptic searches constantly for truth, but without success. Misled by failure, he willfully renounces assent and resorts to equipollence and suspension. After this decision has been forced upon him by the problems of philosophy, the skeptic unexpectedly finds himself in possession of his end (*ἀταραξία*). But we can readily discern the great differences between the painful *ἐποχή* forced on the mind by the difficulties of nature and the self-satisfied *ἐποχή* which leads to tranquillity. No amount of Pyrronian explanation can obscure the contradictory character of *ἐποχή* considered under both aspects. And only a clear distinction between the two phases mentioned above affords us a thorough insight into the nature of the skeptic attitude.

<sup>25</sup> "For the Sceptic, having set out to philosophize with the object of passing judgement on the sense-impressions and ascertaining which of them are true and which false, so as to attain quietude thereby, found himself involved in contradictions of equal weight, and being unable to decide between them suspended judgement; and as he was thus in suspense there followed, as it happened, the state of quietude in respect of matters of opinion" (*Outlines*, i, 26 [I, 19]).

<sup>26</sup> See *ibid.*, i, 27-28 (I, 19, 21).

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, i, 28-29 (I, 19, 21).

## PERMANENCE OF BOTH PHASES IN THE SKEPTIC ATTITUDE

We noticed how smoothly the skeptic effected his transition to the second phase; he sincerely believes that he has relinquished none of the advantages implied in spontaneous doubt. In the skeptic mind, the second phase does not replace the first; on the contrary, skepticism holds fast to the characteristics of spontaneous doubt. The skeptic attempts to show that sincerity and spontaneity still dominate his attitude. He introduces himself as the nemesis of dogmatic exaggerations. If his language appears too dogmatic at times, he hastens to repudiate such an interpretation. When he wishes to explain the skeptic attitude in itself, he emphasizes the spontaneous aspect; he seems to feel that there alone his attitude may claim an inkling of dignity.

The two phases are not separated in the works of Sextus; they are confused in what the skeptic believes to be a perfectly legitimate unification.<sup>28</sup> One or the other phase prevails according to his different preoccupations. While entering into the second phase, the skeptic reflects on the first; he still claims to inquire after truth, but renounces all hope of ever attaining it, or even of going towards it in any way whatsoever.

This concomitance of the two phases explains the basic difficulties involved in a correct interpretation of the skeptic attitude. Historians have tried more or less to judge Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonism as another system in the thought of ancient times. Baffled by numerous inconsistencies, they have either accused Sextus of being a poor exponent of Pyrrhonism or examined for the most part questions of secondary importance relating to the life or medical affiliation of Sextus.<sup>29</sup> No sooner have we isolated a characteristic of the second phase than we find a text emphasizing the first phase and contradicting our previous conclusion. Such is the inevitable penalty for considering Pyrrhonism as a system. The characteristics of the first phase are closely related to those of the second phase in a background of confusion and ignorance. The two phases are constantly present in the skeptic attitude; they constitute the two poles of influence which may be found more or less in any systematic departure from the principles of realism.

The two phases may be clearly distinguished in their extreme manifestations. But there lies a region of indeterminacy in the transition

<sup>28</sup> When studying this duality, not in the genesis of the skeptic attitude, but as constitutive parts of the mature attitude, perhaps it would be more exact to replace the word "phase" by "aspect." However, retention of the word "phase" reminds us of the origin of the dualism which is found at the very heart of skepticism.

<sup>29</sup> Saisset, *Le Scepticisme* (Paris: Didier, 1865).

from one phase to the other. Most of the skeptic states of mind partake of both phases. This confusion does not warrant a rejection of the theory; on the contrary, the theory affords us with the only means of explaining the basic reasons for this confusion.

One may rightfully inquire how the skeptics can maintain such an attitude. Sextus and his predecessors were aware of the contradiction, but this was no problem for them from the viewpoint of speculation. Sextus, however, attempts to conciliate the two phases by explaining and correcting the dogmatic appearance of his principles.<sup>30</sup> Time and time again, he shows his concern over the negative dogmatism implied in the second phase. He feels vaguely the insurmountable difficulty involved in a conciliation of spontaneous and systematic doubt. The first phase presents skepticism as a *fieri*; the second crystallizes this *fieri*, and should logically destroy the progressive character of spontaneous doubt.<sup>31</sup>

The skeptic is not a philosopher; he despises those who glory in this title. His mind thrives on voluntary ignorance and indetermination. We already noted this characteristic in the definition of skepticism.<sup>32</sup> The Pyrrhonian does not attribute any value to apprehension; he rejects definition, which is the cornerstone of science. He does not admit any contact with reality and his phenomenalist theory of knowledge serves merely as a precaution against the attacks of the dogmatists. The two phases always pervade the skeptic attitude; and no explanation of the skeptic states of mind is complete without situating them in this dual context.

#### GENESIS AND INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE SKEPTIC STATES OF MIND

An attitude is an orientation of thought. It may be diversely manifested according to the nature of the problems presented to the mind. Three main preoccupations govern the skeptic states of mind. First the skeptic must react against those who attempt to construct science by starting from an observation of reality. Secondly he must

<sup>30</sup> Compare the analogy of the cathartic which is eliminated along with the waste matters of the body (*Outlines*, i, 206 [I, 123]; Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, i, 76) and the analogy of the ladder which the workman can topple over after using it to reach the roof of a house (*Against the Logicians*, ii, 481; Vol. II of *Sextus Empiricus*, trans. R. G. Bury ["Loeb Classical Library"; 3 vols.; Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press], p. 489).

<sup>31</sup> See *Outlines*, i, 18 (I, 13), where the two phases are implied.

<sup>32</sup> Especially in the last application of the phrase *καθ' οιονδήποτε τρόπον* (*ibid.*, i, 9 [I, 6]).

determine his stand on general and particular judgment. Thirdly he must assign and describe an end or reason for his way of thinking. Each of these preoccupations brings about particular states of mind which reflect the skeptic attitude in the several cases. We shall endeavor in this section to define those different states of mind according to the Pyrrhonian texts of Sextus and co-ordinate them in the general scheme of skepticism.

#### EQUIPOLLENCE AND ITS SOURCES

Sextus uses many expressions to designate the difficulties which impede knowledge at its very root in the observation of reality. *Inconstancy* (*ἀνωμαλία*), *opposites* (*ἀντικείμενα*), *antithesis* (*ἀντίθεσις*), *controversy* (*διαφωνία*) often appear in his writings. They all signify, despite individual differences which we shall try to determine, the obstacles that prevent certitude in our knowledge of reality.

#### INCONSTANCY OF THINGS (*ἀνωμαλία*)<sup>33</sup>

Sextus often refers to the inconstancy of things. He means by this the unstable nature of the impressions we receive from the same object or, more generally, the difficulties encountered by the mind in its attempted conciliation of the widely diverging aspects of reality. Though the skeptic would seem at times to place inconstancy in things, we must not see there a proof of objectivity.<sup>34</sup> On the contrary, he asserts nothing concerning things in themselves, but only concerning phenomena which appear to present the real to the mind. Evidently the things referred to in this connection are nothing but the representations of the mind; because of their inconstancy, man fails in his attempt to posit them as true images of reality.

In another text, Sextus indicates more clearly that inconstancy can only be properly applied to the affections of knowledge. He substitutes φαινόμενά τε καὶ νοούμενα<sup>35</sup> for the word πράγματα. By "noumena," Sextus does not mean the natures in themselves, but whatever certain people feel justified to assert on the basis of phenomenal observation. Our knowledge of reality is limited to phenomena; yet they clothe reality in such deceiving raiments that we cannot affirm anything concerning their substrata, that is, concerning the natures of things.

<sup>33</sup> Ἀνωμαλία, "uneven surface": from the privative prefix ἀ(v) and ὁμαλός, "sleek," "uniform" (*ὁμός*, "like," "similar"). Most of the etymologies given in this study are taken from E. Boisacq, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1923); for ἀνωμαλία, see pp. 700, 702.

<sup>34</sup> ". . . perturbed by the contradiction in things. . ." (*Outlines*, i, 12 [I, 9]).

<sup>35</sup> "So, too, the Sceptics were in hopes of gaining quietude by means of a decision regarding the disparity of the objects of sense and of thought . . ." (*ibid.*, i, 29 [I, 21]).

Despite this reference to natures, the skeptic does not presume to know their properties or existence; he sets them forth as hypotheses.<sup>36</sup> According to his principles, the skeptic should never mention objects or natures, for the words have no meaning in his mind. But, he contends, dogmatic opponents constantly use the words; so, to confound them and further strengthen his attitude, he accepts temporarily their existence, with a view to emphasizing the inconsistencies which follow from such an acceptance as a result of the inconstancy peculiar to our knowledge of reality.<sup>37</sup>

The tropes,<sup>38</sup> or reasons for suspending judgment, have as their object to expose in all possible ways the inconstancy of the impressions we receive from the so-called external world. We do not know things except through phenomena; and the phenomena are so unstable, even when they appear to apply to the same nature, that we can affirm nothing concerning this nature; we can say at most what it appears to be. There lies at the bottom of this phenomenism, of course, a

<sup>36</sup> ". . . by 'all things' he means not existing things but such of the non-evident matters investigated by the Dogmatists as he has examined . . ." (*ibid.*, i, 198 [I, 117]).

<sup>37</sup> ". . . but when it comes to the independent and real nature of the objects, this we shall be unable to describe because of the divergency in the sense-impressions which is due to the combinations" (*ibid.*, i, 132 [I, 79]).

<sup>38</sup> The skeptic aims at achieving the most radical agnosticism by destroying all possibility of speculative assent. He seeks out every difficulty capable of causing confusion in the mind. Many of the difficulties apply universally and seem sufficient to produce skepticism. Sextus calls them "tropes." The skeptics have constructed two main sets of tropes—the tropes on relativity, which emphasize the errors of sense knowledge, and the dialectical tropes of Agrippa, which insist on formal difficulties in the process of reasoning. The tropes of relativity are more immediately concerned with the inconstancy of sense knowledge. The ten main difficulties developed and systematized by Aenesidemus are as follows. 1) The same object produces different representations according to the differences in the animals that perceive it (*ibid.*, i, 40 [I, 27]). 2) The same object is viewed differently by different men (*ibid.*, i, 79 [I, 47]). 3) The same object is known differently by the different senses of one man (*ibid.*, i, 91 [I, 55]). 4) The same object is known differently by the same sense according to different circumstances, such as sleep, age, joy, health, and so on (*ibid.*, i, 100 [I, 59, 61]). 5) Our representations vary with positions, distances, places (*ibid.*, i, 118 [I, 69, 71]). 6) The object is inevitably mixed up with heterogeneous elements both subjective and objective (*ibid.*, i, 124 [I, 73]). 7) The object impresses us differently according to changes in quantity and composition (*ibid.*, i, 129 [I, 77]). 8) The object is always relative at least to the knowing subject and as such unknowable in its nature (*ibid.*, i, 135 [I, 79, 81]). 9) The same event makes different impressions according to the frequency of occurrence (*ibid.*, i, 141 [I, 83, 85]). 10) The tenth trope emphasizes the different values attached to the same object because of the diversity in moral rules, customs, laws, myths, and for the same country, in time and place (*ibid.*, i, 145 [I, 85, 87]).

latent dogmatism bearing on the unity and permanence of natures. But the skeptics are so entangled in their difficulties that they have no time to dwell on this inconsistency; at any rate, they would be the first to condemn such an interpretation of their attitude. In their minds, inconstancy seems to apply only to the diversity of impressions which the skeptics relate tentatively to the hypothetical natures propounded by the dogmatists.

#### OPPOSITES (*ἀντικείμενα*)<sup>39</sup>

The mind uses this diversity to oppose the representations received from without. In *ἀντικείμενα*, more is implied than in *ἀνωμαλία*. The fact of the inconstancy of phenomena affords the material element of doubt; the formal element would result from the expression of inconstancy in the form of oppositions. This division of impressions in opposites is more closely related to the acceptance of doubt; for, if the skeptic succeeds in maintaining his oppositions, the doubt is *ipso facto* established in the mind.

The word "opposites" implies an idea of struggle or fight.<sup>40</sup> However, there is no similarity to Heraclitus who posits contrariety in the very essence of things. Sextus attributes a merely phenomenalist meaning to his word; he has no intention of passing judgment on the opposition or harmony within the natures themselves. His opposition does not transcend the subjective level.<sup>41</sup> In his opinion there is no possibility of determining the relations between appearance and nature; the appearance will forever remain an appearance, and as such be utterly incapable of revealing the things in themselves. The tropes of Aenesidemus insist on this radical incompatibility of phenomena and nature. The tropes of Agrippa result from a higher dialectic; they presuppose and transcend the difficulties of Aenesidemus, insisting particularly on the opposition between doctrines (*ἀντίθεσις*), and the ensuing controversy (*διαφωνία*).

#### ANTITHESIS (*ἀντίθεσις*)<sup>42</sup>

Antithesis seems to imply a subjective reaction to the conflict of the *ἀντικείμενα*. The apparent opposition of things is paralleled by similar oppositions in knowledge. Sextus affirms explicitly that

<sup>39</sup> 'Αντικείμενα: ἀντί, "against"; κείμειν, "to be placed" (Boisacq, *op. cit.*, pp. 64, 425).

<sup>40</sup> See *Outlines*, i, 10, 190 (I, 7, 109, 111).

<sup>41</sup> Oppositions develop an equipollence that is purely subjective. Cf. *ibid.*, i, 190 (I, 109, 111).

<sup>42</sup> 'Αντίθεσις: ἀντί, "in front of," "against"; τίθημι, "to place." Cf. Boisacq, *op. cit.*, pp. 64, 969.

antitheses prepare immediately for suspension of judgment.<sup>43</sup> The tropes themselves offer a systematization of antitheses formed by the mind on the basis of the oppositions which characterize our contacts with reality.<sup>44</sup> The inconstancy of phenomena provides a remote foundation for constructing the tropes. Inconstancy must be expressed in oppositions to become antitheses, that is, oppositions known as such and set forth by the mind. By "antithesis" the skeptic means more than actual oppositions between phenomena and noumena; the term includes as well the unending conflict waged by the different philosophical systems. Controversy follows naturally from all these antitheses.

### CONTROVERSY ( $\deltaιαφωνία$ )<sup>45</sup>

Controversy enables the skeptic to elaborate his most potent weapons; otherwise he would be reduced in theory to note the indecision forced upon us by our knowledge of reality. In his endeavor to show that controversy is prevalent among philosophers and is firmly rooted in a hopeless confusion of phenomena and natures, he must necessarily determine his own stand and develop his dialectics to meet the challenge of the dogmatists; that is, he must act as if he placed skepticism on common ground with the dogmatic systems.

Although "controversy" applies properly to divergencies of opinion among philosophers,<sup>46</sup> its meaning is just as easily extended to include the different representations<sup>47</sup> of one philosopher as the conflicting doctrines of different individuals. However, the opposed systems force the skeptic, as it were, to determine theories of his own and *ipso facto* encounter grave difficulties from the viewpoint of consistency. The rashness ( $\piροπέτεια$ ) manifested by the dogmatists in propounding thoroughly conflicting systems with a great show of certitude has an enormous influence on the formation of ancient skepticism as transmitted to us by Sextus in the Pyrrhonian tradition and by Cicero according to a mitigated version of the Academic tradition.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>43</sup> "Speaking generally, one may say that it is the result of setting things in opposition" (*Outlines*, i, 31 [I, 23]).

<sup>44</sup> "But in order that we may have a more exact understanding of these antitheses I will describe the Modes by which suspension of judgement is brought about . . ." (*ibid.*, i, 35 [I, 23]).

<sup>45</sup>  $\Deltaιαφωνία$ : διά, primitive sense of "in two," "separately"; φωνή from φημι, "to talk," "to say" (Boisacq, *op. cit.*, pp. 183, 1024).

<sup>46</sup> Cf. *Outlines*, i, 85, 90, 98, 113 (I, 51, 55, 59, 67); ii, 8, 12, etc. (I, 155, 159).

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.* i, 26 (I, 19).

<sup>48</sup> Controversy based on relativity (in this way Agrippa's dialectical tropes are dependent on the difficulties of Aenesidemus) is the starting point of Agrippa's tropes. 1) Controversy: the diversity of philosophical systems is so

By far the larger portion of Sextus's books is intended to expose the ridiculous nature of dogmatic claims to certitude.<sup>49</sup> Antidogmatism emphasizing the rashness of the dogmatists is the mainstay of the skeptic attitude in the hostile environment of the philosophical schools. This antidogmatism of the skeptics expresses itself most fittingly in the formal difficulties assembled by Agrippa which revolve around controversy.

### INAPPREHENSIBILITY (*ἀκαταληψία*)<sup>50</sup>

The unending (*ἀνεπίχριτον*) conflict of appearances brings us to the conclusion that the real is inapprehensible. The skeptic confesses his inability to attain things in themselves. But this inability must be interpreted in a phenomenalist context which distinguishes it from the inapprehensibility professed by the Academics.<sup>51</sup> Things appear unknowable to the skeptic because of the difficulties encountered in his perceptions of them.<sup>52</sup> There is no reason for becoming dogmatic; for the skeptic does not even pretend to know whether or not things exist. Both alternatives are equal (*ἴσοι*) in his estimation. Since he knows nothing concerning the natures, he finds himself in a state of ignorance regarding noumena which gives all of them an equal value for the mind (*ἴσοτης*); in other words, they have no value whatever, because, if true and false have an equal value in knowledge, the skeptic does not know anything of truth or falsity. He must endeavor to conciliate his phenomenal data on exterior reality with the inapprehensibility of things. Again the tropes come to the rescue by insisting on the oppositions and difficulties involved in phenomena and by dis-

irreducible that man is forced to suspend judgment (*ibid.*, i, 95 [I, 57]). 2) Infinite regress: to prefer one system or opinion above all others, man must have a reason; but this reason itself must be proved, and so on to infinity. In other words, we have never really proved our first proposition (*ibid.*, i, 166 [I, 95]). 3) Relativity: the same object takes on different appearances according to different objective and subjective conditions; the nature cannot be known in itself, but only in its appearance (*ibid.*, i, 167). 4) Hypothesis: if you wish to avert infinite regress, you might stop at a so-called first principle. If this principle is justified, it must be founded on something else, and again we are involved in infinite regress; or it is arbitrary, and then its contradictory is just as valid, and we have not progressed in the least (*ibid.*, i, 168). 5) Vicious circle: the only other way to escape infinite regress is by using the conclusion to prove the premises (*ibid.*, i, 169 [I, 95, 97]).

<sup>49</sup> "When the Dogmatists—a self-loving class of men—assert that in judging things they ought to prefer themselves to other people, we know that their claim is absurd . . ." (*ibid.*, i, 90 [I, 55]).

<sup>50</sup> *'Ακαταληψία*: privative prefix *ἀ*; *κατά*, "alongside another in such a way as to touch it"; *λαμβάνω*, "to take, to seize." Cf. Boisacq, *op. cit.*, pp. 420, 553.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. *Outlines*, i, 1 ff. (I, 3 ff.).

<sup>52</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, i, 200-201 (I, 117, 119).

qualifying the same phenomena as a steppingstone to the knowledge of natures. The mind seems naturally inclined to pass from appearance to being,<sup>53</sup> that is, to judge natures by appearances; the tropes guard against this dogmatical abuse of reasoning.

In conformity with the views expressed in the preceding paragraphs, the skeptic equality of arguments or of representations has nothing in common with a metaphysical equality of things such as could be inferred from the atomism of Democritus. On the contrary, it is an equality of knowledge, which finds no reason to accept one proposition more than its contradictory, because it feels utterly incapable of attaining the natures of things. Equality, like inconstancy, is wholly subjective; it explains the skeptic admission of inapprehensibility by avoiding any reference to the things in themselves.<sup>54</sup>

#### EQUIPOLLENCE (*ἴσοσθένεια*)<sup>55</sup>

We are now in a position to show the important role of equipollence in the skeptic attitude. In the first book of his *Outlines*, Sextus informs us that skepticism rests on the fundamental principle of equipollence, which may be expressed thus: It is always possible to pair any argument with another argument that has equal force and concludes to the opposite of the first.<sup>56</sup> There are many texts, however, which apply "equipollence" to opposite appearances as well as arguments.<sup>57</sup> Indeed, "equipollence" contains virtually the terms we have previously explained.

In the first phase, the skeptic does not strive to achieve equipollence; it is merely forced upon him by the uncertainties of knowledge. This sense of "equipollence" prevails in the texts where Sextus explains the genesis of the skeptic attitude; equipollence is imposed on the mind by the instability of phenomena.<sup>58</sup> When the mind discovers that tranquillity follows upon suspension of judgment, that way of considering equipollence is radically changed; it ceases to be a cause of anguish, a troubled state reluctantly accepted, and becomes a state of mind

<sup>53</sup> For example, *ibid.*, i, 135, 198 (I, 79, 81; 117).

<sup>54</sup> "... λέγομεν τὴν κατὰ πίστιν καὶ ἀποτίαν ισότητα, ὡς μηδένα μηδενὸς προκεῖσθαι τῶν μαχομένων . . ." (*ibid.*, i, 10 [I, 6, 8]; cf. also i, 190 [I, 109, 111]). We may compare Sextus to Kant on this point. Although decidedly dogmatic from the Pyrrhonian viewpoint, Kant rejects knowledge of natures for subjective reasons; but he does not reject the possibility of a superior intuition (not found in man) knowing the natures. Sextus refrains from affirming that the present conditions of man's knowledge make it impossible to know natures.

<sup>55</sup> *Ίσοσθένεια*: *ἴσος*, "equal"; *σθένος*, "force" (Boisacq, *op. cit.*, pp. 383, 862).

<sup>56</sup> "... παντὶ λόγῳ λόγον ίσον ἀντικεῖσθαι . . ." (*Outlines*, i, 12 [I, 8]).

<sup>57</sup> *ibid.*, i, 26 (I, 18).

<sup>58</sup> *ibid.*, i, 190 (I, 108, 110).

deliberately provoked by bringing to attention all possible oppositions between phenomena and noumena.<sup>59</sup>

One can never overemphasize the subjective character of equipollence. Sextus would not admit the possibility of founding assent on subjective criteria. There seems to linger within his mind an unconscious admission that truth is found in judgment, and that judgment implies an application of our concepts to reality. According to Sextus, we cannot affirm that one proposition is more probable than another,<sup>60</sup> for even this encroaches to a certain extent on the realm of hidden things ( $\delta\delta\eta\lambda\alpha$ ).

The Pyrrhonian equipollence cannot be assimilated in any way to its metaphysical counterparts in the systems of philosophers such as Heraclitus, Protagoras, or Democritus. Heraclitus and the others claim to know the natures of things; they err in transposing the confusion of their minds into the reality of things. Skeptic equipollence results from our mode of attaining reality, but it must be explained by the inadequacies of our knowledge of natures; it does not reflect in the least the objective constitution of the real.<sup>61</sup> Moreover, the Pyrrhonian viewpoint would have been impossible in the first period of Greek philosophy, for, at that time, no one questioned the objectivity of things. In Sextus, however, that is the preliminary problem whose very difficulty would stop knowledge at the beginning.

Thus, inapprehensibility, in the sense determined by Sextus, governs the skeptic attitude towards substantial reality; it brings about a state of equipollence in all judgments. However, the texts would warrant a different arrangement of inapprehensibility and equipollence whereby the former would come after the latter: inapprehensibility may be considered as resulting from the supposed fact that equipollence is the only conclusion to be drawn from a close scrutiny of our knowledge of reality.<sup>62</sup>

<sup>59</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, i, 9 (I, 7).

<sup>60</sup> " 'Equipollence' we use of equality in respect of probability and improbability, to indicate that no one of the conflicting judgements takes precedence of any other as being more probable" (*ibid.*, i, 10 [I, 7, 9]).

<sup>61</sup> ". . . the objects appear to us equal as regards credibility and incredibility. As to whether they are equal we make no positive assertion. . ." (*ibid.*, i, 196 [I, 115]).

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, i, 200 (I, 117, 119).

INDETERMINATION (*ἀοριστία*)<sup>63</sup>

Equipollence causes a state of indetermination in the mind. This state follows upon our ignorance of natures. Definitions formulate the essences of things; but equipollence is based on our inability to know the fundamental natures. Consequently the mind must accept a state of indefiniteness or indetermination which shuns all definition as the most horrible manifestation of rashness.<sup>64</sup> This indetermination is in full accord with the tenets of Pyrrhonian phenomenalism.<sup>65</sup>

[*To be continued*]

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<sup>63</sup> ἀοριστία: privative prefix ἀ; δρός, "limit, frontier." Boisacq, *op. cit.*, p. 716.

<sup>64</sup> "... τὴν τερατείαν ἔκεινην . . ." (*Outlines*, iii, 80 [I, 382]).

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, i, 199 (I, 117).

## BOOK REVIEWS

**THE DIVINE RELATIVITY: A SOCIAL CONCEPTION OF GOD.** By Charles Hartshorne. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1948. Pp. xvi + 164. \$2.75.

These lectures delivered at Yale University on the Terry Foundation constitute a notable essay in natural theology. They are in the spirit of Whitehead's metaphysics and share in both the merits and the defects of that way of thinking. Attention must first be called to the many valuable aspects of the work. What strikes a welcome note at once is the seriousness, even passion, with which Professor Hartshorne addresses himself to problems about the divine nature. There is no hesitation about either the worthwhileness of investigations in the theological field or the mind's ability to arrive at rigorously scientific conclusions therein. Furthermore, the book tries to take account of previous speculation as well as follow along a new path. There is no pretense that our thinking must start entirely from scratch, and yet the whole drift of the argument is that important aspects of God's nature are now being explored for the first time. In the course of this voyage of discovery, the author avails himself of the latest aids from the other sciences, especially semantics.

The thesis which Hartshorne propounds with admirable brevity and consistency is that both absoluteness and relativity are predicate of God. He agrees with traditional natural theology in asserting a certain nonrelative being of God, and with pragmatic empiricism in relating God to the issues which arise in the human world. But God has these diverse characters under different aspects of his all-inclusive nature. In his infinite, fixed, and unrelated being, God is an abstract, possible, and universal entity. He becomes actual and concrete only when this generic essence is embodied in the divine subject or person. This concrete embodiment is equivalent to the assumption of adequate relations with the entire actual world.

In his abstract side, God has the universal and necessary, but undetermined, capacity to know whatever is knowable and to love, and feel sympathetically toward, whatever can arouse such response. But

the determinate actualization of these capacities is achieved only through divine acts of knowing and feeling for the actual world of experience which develops. The tragic and satisfactory events in the world make a difference to God in his relative nature. He is not unaffected by them, but embraces them in his uniquely sensitive awareness. His containment and responsiveness to the human situation are real and literal, enabling us to contribute in no mere metaphorical way to his satisfaction and social perfection.

Hartshorne believes that this doctrine of surrelativism effects a higher synthesis of absolutism and pragmatism. It does not deny God's absoluteness and infinity, nor does it endanger his personal-social relationship with the human community. Since the divine essence also remains forever distinct from the actual totality of relations in the world of process and concrete divinity, the position is said to be distinguished from pantheism. On the other hand, it is openly at odds with the full statement of ordinary theism. For this reason, Hartshorne prefers to call his theory of the divine relativity *panentheism*, since God, in His actual being is totally inclusive of the actual states of experience. It might be noted in passing that Father Przywara used to employ the term *panentheism* to describe the Thomistic view of the real relation of the world to God and God's immanence in the world. Przywara would probably call Hartshorne's position a variety of pantheistic *theopanism*.

Although attack is made occasionally upon atheistic philosophers like Nicolai Hartmann, they are censured mainly for having taken the traditional explanation as definitive and hence for believing that their refutation of this view settled the theological problem. Far from it, according to Hartshorne. His sharpest criticism is reserved for ordinary theism and, more specifically, for what he regards as the Thomistic doctrine. He sometimes allows himself to be carried away with indignation at the shameful combination of intellectual obscurantism and theologicopolitical worship of power which his concept of Romanism presents. But at the same time, he reiterates his debts to the Schoolmen and states his criticisms in technical and systematic fashion. It would be a great mistake to dismiss his contentions as the result of sheer ignorance and prejudice.

Yet it would be an equally disastrous error to concentrate one's evaluation of the book upon this or that thesis. The trouble does not lie primarily in the fruit, but in the stock and roots of reasoning. In his eagerness to get on with a discussion of particular issues, Hartshorne has left unclarified the nature of the science within whose framework

he is operating. As he himself puts it: "Whether and how we can distinguish between metaphysics and logic is more difficult to say. I am not sure that they do differ" (p. xiv). His actual practice in this essay indicates that for him the difference, if any, is irrelevant to the outcome in natural theology. In the one place where he notes a difference between logical and metaphysical interests in relation (p. 108), he does not stop to inquire further into the reasons for, or the broader significance of, this difference. Only because he does not see that the being studied by metaphysics is radically distinct from the object of logic, is the author enabled to employ the method he does and reach the conclusions set forth in the present volume. Semantics is not only of preliminary and incidental help in this inquiry; it is the mainstay of the whole enterprise. It defines the exact sense in which Hartshorne is indebted to Aquinas. The latter source is mainly important for supplying theological sentences which can be submitted to purely formal analysis for the sake of proposing dilemmas and exposing contradictions in the traditional mind. In an auxiliary status, semantic analysis often does perform an indispensable service in eliminating imprecisions and hidden fallacies. But when its logical standpoint is substituted for the metaphysical, then its very facility in stating issues in terms of postulated meanings leads the mind astray in speculation about God. Hartshorne accepts certain doctrines of Aquinas and parts company with Carnap on particular points. Yet he does not observe the different lines of intelligibility followed by their respective disciplines.

Otherwise, he would not have attempted the impossible task of discussing the divine nature and the question of God and the world in complete independence of whether God exists and how we know that he does. The contention is that the former issues can be settled autonomously in function of a consistent synthesis (surrelativism) standing in conspicuous contrast to a self-contradictory absolutism. In the same vein, he maintains that "it is entirely neutral to this argument [that divine knowing establishes a real relation of God to the world] whether, or in what sense, divine knowledge creates its object" (p. 11). But the charge of inconsistency can be sustained against the Thomistic philosophy of the divine nature only on condition that all the major factors determining the meaning of this theory are taken into account. Now the precise sense of the Thomistic doctrine on God's essence, attributes, and knowledge of the world cannot be grasped in isolation from the Thomistic proofs of God's existence from the actual relations his effects bear toward him. It is on the basis of the actual world, rather

than of constructed formal meanings in some purely essential order, that Aquinas explored the nature of God. Hartshorne inquires about whether the divine actuality would be really related to the world, if the divine essence were pure possibility and nonactual. Aquinas would agree that an actuality of this sort would sustain real predicamental relations, but he would add that such an actuality would not be divine. Aquinas proceeds on the conviction that his proofs of God's existence have led to a divine essence which is itself supremely actual and existent. The consistency of the Thomistic position about the attributes cannot be ascertained apart from a careful weighing of this capital disagreement.

St. Thomas did not set down his proofs of God's existence as mere summaries of the philosophical commonplaces of the day. His revolutionary mission in natural theology began functioning with the questions on the nature of sacred science and the demonstration of God's existence, not with the questions on the divine simplicity and the other attributes. He saw the need for a complete reconstruction which not only *begins with* demonstrations of God's existence, but is *governed by* the type of demonstration employed there and the precise conclusion reached about God's existence. There is no other way of gathering the meaning of the Thomistic teaching on God's nature than by tracing it forward as a continuation of the problem of God's existence. That his existence must be, and can only be, demonstrated from the experienced world of creatures, and that what we can know is only the truth of the proposition "God exists" (God is his own pure act of existing)—these are the regulative principles which organize and determine the entire subsequent discussion about the divine perfections. They set the mark of existential import upon all that follows, making it necessary to include at each step some reference to the identity of God's nature and attributes with the supreme act of existing. Because Hartshorne does not advert to this reference, he does not fulfill the indispensable condition for testing even the coherence of meaning in the Thomistic view of divine knowledge, creative power, and absence of predicamental relations in God.

Hartshorne frequently mentions that he is also engaged upon a book about God's existence. Presumably it will embody the main points in a number of his recent articles and critical exchanges in philosophical journals. There he has been advocating the revival of the ontological argument. This is in keeping with his stand in *The Divine Relativity*. And, indeed, unless God could be known in an a priori and essentialist way, there would be no justification for the way in which inferences are made in this book. Hartshorne's strictures on traditional theism must

be brought back to their real center. The underlying questions are still these: Is there an ultimate identity between metaphysics and logic? and Can the existence of God be ascertained by us men from an analysis of what we may mean as his essence? Since St. Thomas has answered both questions in the negative, the groundwork has not yet been laid for testing the consistency and truth of his natural theology. And neither has Hartshorne established the premise which would permit him to determine questions about the divine essence and actuality apart from God's existence and our manner of knowing it.

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PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS. By Bertrand Russell. Cambridge,  
at the University Press; New York: Macmillan Co., 1947.  
Pp. 29. 75¢

One test of the wisdom of a philosopher consists in seeing how he relates the conclusions of his speculative thinking to the fundamental problems of political life. The value of our present text, which was delivered as a lecture to members of the National Book League (England) in the fall of 1946, derives from the fact that Bertrand Russell is here expressing the political wisdom of his maturity. This he sums up in the concluding paragraph of the text in the words:

In our day as in the time of Locke, empiricist Liberalism (which is not incompatible with democratic socialism) is the only philosophy that can be adopted by a man who, on the one hand, demands some scientific evidence for his beliefs, and, on the other hand, desires human happiness more than the prevalence of this or that party or creed (p. 30).

The author begins his advance to that pronouncement with a remark about the wisdom of the British (I prefer to use the word "English") who, he says, are distinguished among the peoples of modern Europe by the excellence of their philosophers and by their contempt for philosophy. Being Irish myself and thus belonging to the nation which, in addition to giving Europe its first systematic philosophical system, has managed at all times to keep an attentive eye fixed upon the doings of the English, I think there is a more accurate way of referring to the fact to which Bertrand Russell alludes.

There is certainly a characteristic English approach to the problems of living; but that peculiar English way should not be called empiricist liberalism, which is merely a rather vicious and corruptive approach

to human problems. What we may learn from history is that the wisdom peculiar to the English has appeared at its best in their lawyers and statesmen, not in their philosophers. This may be readily understood by anyone who will read, for example, R. W. Chambers's perfect and profound *Thomas More*, provided only that he thinks rightly, as St. Thomas Aquinas would say. The Englishman, picked at random, to whom you explained that his practical grasp of daily life was really philosophical empiricism, would simply deny the fact, thinking the while that you were being both abstract and impractical.

The truth is that it is always a delicate matter to make a generalization about a people taken as a whole. An element of determination, which involves some indication of an ideal type, is always involved in the process, so that if one is not wise one will be bound to make the mistake of deforming the reality which one is attempting to conceive. Chesterton, because of his quite open love for all things, was much more right about the quality of the English than is Bertrand Russell, who lived for years with abstract constructs until, as he has himself admitted, he was overcome by nausea. In much the same way, Princess Elizabeth, who comes from a good family, is much more likely to be right about what is necessary for stable family life than is any feminine intellectual of socialising and legalistic tendencies who thinks first, not of the family, but of some technical means of regularizing the situations which result from certain individual failures to attain the family good. Furthermore, a philosopher cannot hope to reach the truth in determinations of the kind we are talking of if he has not already reached some analogous wise determination concerning himself. One would have less distrust of Bertrand Russell's practical conclusions had his earlier work been less subject to the driving influence of very strong emotions.

In the course of leading up to the statement that "the only philosophy which affords theoretical justification of democracy in its temper of mind, is empiricism" (p. 20), Bertrand Russell considers briefly, and without much attention to temporal sequence, the philosophy of the past. For him, "most philosophy has been a reaction against scepticism" (p. 10), in ages when authority no longer suffices to produce a socially necessary minimum of belief. Therefore, a deep insincerity affects most philosophy. Protagoras and Hume are exceptions (presumably, I suppose, in their speculative thinking, but certainly not in their political views), by reason of their thoroughgoing skepticism. Plato and Hegel, who represent orthodoxy (don't words live a queer life!) are said to have answered Protagoras and Hume (a general sigh of

relief!); but the really serious opposition they had to face is said to have come from Democritus and Locke, the empiricists—empiricism, in each case, being associated with democracy and utilitarian ethics. Orthodox philosophy, by contrast, is the champion of "injustice, cruelty and opposition to progress" (p. 11). It is hard luck on orthodoxy, for it is of course true that both Plato and Hegel excelled in the fabrication of political monstrosities. Whatever be the present state of Platonic studies, Bertrand Russell could hardly be more correct when he writes: "That Plato's *Republic* should have been admired, on its political side, by decent people, is perhaps the most astonishing example of literary snobbery in all history" (p. 13). Nor is he wrong when he draws attention to the salient features of Plato's essay in totalitarianism, the inhuman exclusion of poets from the City, the fixing of a vulgar standard in music, the finalizing of education upon the courage required for war, the practice of trickery and lying by the governing oligarchy, "trickery in manipulating the drawing of lots for eugenic purposes and elaborate lying to persuade the population that there are biological differences between the upper and the lower classes" (p. 13). Nor has he forgotten that in Plato's state there will be large-scale infanticide when children are born otherwise than as a result of governmental swindling.

But when Bertrand Russell reacts in that way to the inhuman Platonic politics—and he has similar reactions to Hegelian and to Marxist politics—what is not clear is that he so reacts because of empiricism. He even takes the trouble to assure us that his acceptance of the empiricist theory of knowledge is a qualified one. As a matter of fact, there is no necessary deduction of a horror of infanticide from empiricism. And, in fact, all that we have here is another manifestation of the sound English common sense which so often breaks out in Bertrand Russell's writing, even when his subject is mathematical philosophy.

What attracts Bertrand Russell principally in Locke is not the theory of knowledge, but rather the common sense, the caution—in other words, the qualities which have always been cultivated by good Englishmen, the very qualities indeed which keep even the most wayward English philosophers in some contact with the earth.

It is a matter for regret that the development of Bertrand Russell's splendid natural endowment of intelligence has been affected by bad or ambiguous influences, among others the contradictions latent in empiricism, the materialism which, as Lenin saw so clearly, is the concealed soul of liberalism, the emotional and unhistorical approach

to political democracy, all of which contribute in one way or another to the making of the judgment which concludes Bertrand Russell's lecture.

There is a lot of truth in the Confucian principle that, since civic order proceeds from the prince, all will be well if all is well with the prince. Similarly, all will be well with democracy, when the democrats practise the political virtues. Like Professor Northrop, who rather naively supposes that the nations can be united by means of a common theory of knowledge rather than on the principle of love, Bertrand Russell attempts to solve the problems of universal political peace, if not in entire abstraction from moral considerations, at least without consideration of the proper means to the end.

It is really quite impossible to determine the English way if one does not see what the English do, if, in other words, one does not keep an ever-attentive eye upon the doings of the English. It should now be beyond doubt that the living representatives of the great and virile English people have in recent times practised the virtue of patriotism, which neither empiricism nor utilitarian ethics renders intelligible. The roots of that finest display of political life grow out of depths which are perhaps beyond the reach of the English philosophers of recent centuries. As for contempt for philosophy, you won't find that except among the cranks. The English prefer the more cautious view of Shakespeare, that there are limits to philosophy. "*Ripeness is all.*"

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ELEMENTS OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY. By Arthur Pap. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. xviii + 526. \$4.60.

This textbook is written in a clear English which at times recalls the exuberance of the early Ayer. Definitions of technical terms used in the text are gathered together in a glossary at the end of the book. Up-to-date bibliographies are placed at the end of each chapter. For its size, the book is not expensive, which is understandable if it is true that analytic philosophy is going to be the fashion for some little time. All it lacks to become the rage is some romantic figure like Sartre to focus popular attention.

Unless I am mistaken, analytic philosophy is what you get when you have ironed out the creases from logical positivism without giving up either the empiricism or the ambition of treating all the issues from a single standpoint. The shocking feature of the present work is its

fluency. While the author makes no claim to make "a complete survey of analytic philosophy," he does aim "to illustrate the method of logical analysis by application to various topics" (p. viii). But since he treats at length of the relation of philosophy to the sciences, of the problems of ethics, of the universals, of theories of knowledge and truth, of the so-called mind-body problem, of causality, probability, the foundations of science, and many other matters, one does wonder if a few fugitive topics have managed to recede sufficiently from view to escape the power of Mr. Pap's avid eye. There is little that he does not touch on in his fast-talking way.

Concerning the quality of analytic philosophy, it is remarked that this study presupposes not competence in a special science or in mathematics, but "a palate for exact thinking and speaking" (p. vi). Hence the subject is said naturally to appeal "to scientifically-minded people more than to religious enthusiasts, poets and painters" (p. vi). Personally, I do not like to see an advertisement for exact thinking followed by a cliché; it offends against good taste.

The true quality of what Mr. Pap has to offer is best seen in the section in which he treats of the question, Does God exist? (p. 325-29). The discussion begins with the question: "But is it, then, meaningless to ask whether God exists?" (p. 325). In 1936, the youthful Ayer answered that question in the affirmative, by a strict deduction from the rigid verifiability theory of early logical positivism. In 1949, in the senility of logical positivism, Mr. Pap has Carnap's principle of tolerance behind him: "The answer is obvious: it all depends on what you mean by God" (p. 325). If ever the analytic philosophers discover a principle of preference which will allow them to say that some languages are to be preferred to others, I should advise religious enthusiasts in search of a philosophy to take a long, hard look at the analysts. For though a principle of preference might make club life more comfortable, it would not constitute a rational basis for the demonstration of the existence of God.

Mr. Pap continues his analysis by using a method which consists in bringing up a collection of possible answers to the initial question, all of which he demolishes to his own satisfaction. In order that readers may appreciate what he really means by "a palate for exact thinking and speaking" I venture to produce two examples of the demolishing process.

He says:

If, as some poets say, God is love, then it is no doubt a meaningful question; only it is then a redundant question

since we all know that love exists—provided that this means nothing more profound than the familiar fact that there are living beings who love each other and possibly inanimate things too (p. 325).

This is really a historic moment. It is the first time I have come on a man who asserts that he knows all about love. Poets may well ask themselves what place they have in our times.

The other example of the analysis deals with the question of the prime mover.

Other theologians and metaphysicians . . . have meant by "God" a being responsible for the beginning of motion, a "prime mover" (Aristotle, St. Thomas). Does "God exists," then, mean: there was a time when things started to move? *Prima facie*, this seems to be intelligible enough. However this is a deceptive appearance, arising from the similarity of this statement to statements like "there was a time when trains started to move," which do make sense. Probing a little deeper, we are soon confronted with difficulties. Surely, if there was a time when things began to move, there must have been an earlier time when there was no motion; for we do not understand what is meant by the beginning of time—if there is a metaphysician who does, let him explain! But to speak of a lapse of time without the occurrence of *any* motion is self-contradictory (p. 326-27).

Now, if that is an example of what results from a palate for exact thinking and speaking, one may ask how it is that there is here displayed an entire ignorance of the texts in which Aristotle and St. Thomas deal with the matters referred to by Mr. Pap. Does the prejudice of empiricism work so powerfully upon the thinking of the analysts that they become constitutionally incapable of the most elementary scholarship?

Among the texts which come to mind as representative of what St. Thomas did say about the beginning of time, the following may usefully be reproduced here. In the *Summa contra Gentiles*, Book II, chapter 33, St. Thomas presents one of the arguments (argument 6) brought forward by those who held that the world had no beginning in time. The argument goes, If time has not always been, we may mark a nonexistence of time prior to its being. In like manner, if it is not always to be, we may mark a nonexistence of it subsequent to its being. But priority and subsequence in point of duration cannot be unless time is; and at that rate time must have been before it was, and shall be after it has ceased, which is absurd. Time, then, must be

eternal. But time is an accident, and cannot be without a subject. But the subject of it is not God, who is above time and beyond motion (see Book I, chapters 13 and 15). The only alternative left is that some created substance must be eternal. In the following chapter, St. Thomas answers this objection, saying that there is nothing in this argument to evince that the very supposition of time's not being supposes that time is. For when we speak of something prior to the being of time, we do not thereby assert any real part of time, but only an imaginary part. When we say, Time has being after not being, we mean that there was no instant of time before this present marked instant.

When Mr. Pap says that we do not understand what is meant by the beginning of time, he really means that we cannot imagine that initial instant. But that is quite a different matter from the assertion that there was an initial instant of time.

It is worth remembering, also, that if St. Thomas refutes conclusively the arguments of those who say that they can demonstrate the eternity of the world, he also refutes the arguments of those who say that they can demonstrate that the world is not eternal (*ibid.*, chap. 38). That makes the whole matter a lot more complex than it appears to be in Mr. Pap's account.

Readers of this book who feel oppressed by the easy tone of superiority with which it is written may derive some consolation from the fact that some progress is being made among the moderns who take an interest in philosophy. After all, over half a century ago philosophical Darwinism was thinking in early pre-Socratic terms. With Mr. Pap we have got as far as the Sophists. Maybe a Socrates walks already among us.

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PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS AND NATURAL SCIENCE. By Hermann Weyl. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. x + 311. \$5.00.

The main part of this book dates from 1926 and is a translation of the article "Philosophie der Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft" that Weyl contributed to R. Oldenbourg's *Handbuch der Philosophie*. The substance of the older text has been preserved, but there have been numerous alterations in detail. References have been brought up to date. In view of Weyl's special position in the controversies about the principles of mathematics, this reprint is of value, if only for its historical

interest. Students of mathematical philosophy should have studied Weyl's views.

The book also contains a number of appendices in which the author deals with the developments in mathematics, physics, and biology since 1926. In view of the interest which some physicists are taking in biology, these appendices make the whole book very valuable.

The appendix devoted to physics and biology, which could usefully be compared with Schrodinger's *What Is Life*, concludes with some remarks which should interest philosophers of nature. Weyl remarks that "scientists would be wrong to ignore the fact that theoretical construction is not the only approach to the phenomena of life; another way, that of understanding from within (interpretation), is open to us" (p. 283). He then draws attention to

the following significant and undeniable fact: the way of constructive theory, during the last three centuries, has proved to be a method that is capable of progressive development of seemingly unlimited width and depth . . . in contrast, the scope of understanding from within appears practically fixed by human language once for all, and may at most be widened a little by the refinements of language, especially of language in the mouths of the poets. Understanding, for the very reason that it is *concrete and full*, lacks the freedom of the "hollow symbol" (p. 284).

A biology from within would lack, Weyl thinks, the "never-ending impetus of problems that drives constructive biology on and on" (p. 284).

Weyl appears to be doing us the signal service of opening up the closed world of science in which recent positivistic philosophers of science would lock us up. But I wonder whether it would not have been better to consider the possibilities of a philosophic biology (a new *De Anima*) rather than those offered by the method of interpretation. One has to agree, of course, that philosophical biology does not offer the particular attractions of constructive biology tied in with the experimental method. But one is also inclined to think that philosophical biologists, in recent times, have not shown that they too, although they deal principally with the remote rather than the proximate principles of vital activities, work in an open field. I think, for instance, of a treatment of the substantial form of life which, in the hands of a philosophical biologist who was well informed in matters of biological science, would clear the air of many of the pseudo-problems raised in controversies about evolution theory.

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ENCOUNTER WITH NOTHINGNESS: AN ESSAY ON EXISTENTIALISM.  
By Helmut Kuhn. Hinsdale, Ill.: Henry Regnery Co., 1949.  
Pp. 168. \$3.00.

Professor Kuhn's essay tries to avoid the extreme partisanship which marks and mars most treatments of existentialism. It refuses to bow to the prevailing American academic fashion of ignoring this philosophy or dismissing it with a few baleful words about cultural decadence and unscientific analysis. The frequent references which Kuhn makes to Plato, the Christian mystics, Kant, and Hegel are indications that a properly conducted discussion must take account of the historical background. As against a narrowly positivistic view of reality, existentialism agrees with the high tradition of philosophy in making us aware of the uniqueness of man and his capacities. Yet Kuhn is not himself enlisted among the existentialists. He regards their function as the transitional one of destroying our remaining complacency about the triumphs and future of scientific intelligence. But he reminds existentialist philosophers that the nihilistic vocation cannot be accepted as absolute. Most of the inconsequences in existentialist thinking spring from an attempt to draw some constructive conclusions from premises which are themselves radically founded in nothingness.

As a way of extricating philosophy from this blind alley without failing to profit by the existentialist episode, Kuhn suggests that the experience of nothingness is essentially ambivalent. Heidegger and Sartre maintain that the nought is the ultimate mystery of being, one which must be celebrated with a bard's inventiveness. What they fail to justify is the character of ultimacy attached to the contingent and temporal aspects of human existence. Other philosophers have also pondered upon these qualities, but they have seen no reason for generalizing them in an unwarranted way to include all being. For there is also the testimony of the religious "encounter with nothingness." When a man brings himself into God's presence, he is overcome by a sense of his own distance and unworthiness. At the same time, he finds it impossible to liken God to any of the beings of the world. The *via negationis* is no subtle device of theologians, but a normal way of expressing God's transcendence and majesty. It remains, however, a *via* rather than a *terminus*: God is the nothingness of superabundant being, just as man is the nothingness of creaturely humility and freedom.

Because Kuhn views existentialism as a "resurrection" of Kierkegaard, he is forced to offer a one-sided account of the existentialist aspect in Kierkegaard himself. He can discover no underlying continuity between Kierkegaard's Christian writings and the manifestoes of atheistic existen-

tialism. Consequently, he is suspicious of the existential character of Kierkegaard's religious thoughts. To save his theory of a Kierkegaard renaissance, Kuhn distinguishes sharply between the pseudonymous and religious works of Kierkegaard, and relegates the Christian existentialism of Gabriel Marcel to the periphery. These devices are an indication of the shortcomings of the method of distilling the spirit of existentialism primarily from what is common to Heidegger and Sartre. Kierkegaard stands in somewhat the same relation to these later philosophers as does the Greek mind to the Hellenists of the Renaissance period.

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**SOCIAL ETHICS, NATURAL LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD.** By J. Messner. Translated from the German manuscript by J. J. Doherty. Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1949. Pp. xiii + 1018. \$10.00.

The translator and the publisher are to be thanked for bringing to English readers this remarkable treatise from the pen of one of the foremost Catholic social thinkers. The scope of the work, in the author's words, is expressed thus:

It will be our task in the remaining parts of this study on the ethics of society, state community, and national economy, to show how definite in regard to details of social order and social reform are the consequences of the principles of natural law when face to face with social reality (p. 269).

The first hundred pages are a teleological approach to natural law. "End occupies a central position in natural law ethics" (p. 21). There is here a good deal of excellent methodology and a sociological consideration of the content of natural law and its dynamic character.

This process implies the continuous interaction of the development of moral consciousness and of social reality, and thus in a true sense, a dialectical evolution. . . . an increasing awareness of fresh implications of natural law is called for (p. 64).

Messner proceeds to a penetrating discussion of man's social nature and the metaphysics of society. This section contains a very extensive consideration of the common good (end and function of society) as actuality, as an order, in its causes and effects, its structural and functional proportionment, its ancillary and pluralistic character. In part three of the first book, social order is discussed as actualization

through man's free will of a predesigned harmony of ends. Law, accordingly, is an order of society and finds its function in ends inherent in man and society. Rights, being the protection of these responsibilities to achieve an ordering of ends, are also characterized as social. Natural law is thus pursued through its juristic manifestations. There is a remarkable sociological discussion of the utilitarian character of law and the pluralism of the juridic order.

Since "the final object of social ethics is the application of these [general] principles to the manifold phenomena of actual social life," Messner proceeds to "the description of the moral duties and the moral rights involved in the particular social relations in which men have to fulfill their existential ends at the present period of human history" (p. 278). We can do no more than detail some of the subjects treated: (1) the family; (2) the lesser groups (local community, ethnico-cultural groups, minorities, occupational groups, classes, parties); (3) the nation (a hundred pages are devoted to the idea of the nation, its origin, the various bonds which constitute it, its relation to the state, the community of nations, and justice and law in an organized community of nations); (4) the ethics of political community. Here is an excellent discussion of the nature of the state, its origin, the state as legal system and organized power, the unit of consent, political pluralism, and the state as welfare community and functional institution.

Messner's treatment of authority (its character, role, original location, forms) follows the Augustinian-medieval socio-political tradition. There is no Hegelianism here. One likes the author's refreshing and sane optimism about possibilities of achieving the rational and the moral. He shows keen insight into the problems of democracy. He frequently addresses himself to the philosophy and sociology of individualism and Marxism with acute perception of the positions criticized. These sections of the book are characterized by wisdom and maturity, and a "total" view closely checked by reference to historical experience. One always has the feeling he is at grips with the real order in all its complexity. For this reason the book can be recommended as a study in methodology for Catholic social scientists.

There is rare reference to the social encyclicals. And one is at a loss to account for the omission of any reference to Heinrich Pesch and to the Solidarists in general.

The last three hundred pages study national economy in its process, organization, and integration. There is a moral treatment of the various economic institutions. But the focal point of discussion is the integration of national economy through price. It begins with a declaration of

allegiance to competition. Competition is the substratum of a truly economic (and therefore just) system of production and distribution. For competition, socially controlled, alone will force prices down to their natural level. Natural price is one that covers the socially necessary costs of production, and the latter implicates socially necessary incomes.

What are the forces of social control in pricing? They are capital, labor, the government, and the consumer. How do they control? By all parties interested in a given price participating in the making of that price. For example, in the making of the price of coal, capital and labor, within each of the industries directly affected by the price of coal, would sit down together with representatives of the consuming public and government to discuss a price for coal which would equal its productive worth to the nation. The price, thus socially administered, then moves freely in competition with other prices. The economics of relative price, substitution, elasticity, and alternatives then take over. Messner's view of the occupational group (vocational group) is unlike that of most Catholic writers, at least in emphasis. For him the focal function is price-making—proper prices representing all social factors involved. The administration of particular "vocation" in the division of labor is underemphasized.

There is, however, a great deal of planning to be done by the occupational groups, with the state playing its proper subsidiary role. Until such time as the vocational group can be so organized, the proper role of the state admits of considerable intervention in the economic process. One finds here most of the tools of recent economic analysis.

This reviewer does not find in Messner's socially controlled competition the same internal consistency and grip on reality that he finds throughout the rest of the book. Readers, however, may very well find this section as satisfying as it is original.

PHILIP S. LAND, S.J.

Saint Louis University

**SOMME THÉOLOGIQUE: II-II. 47-56: LA PRUDENCE.** Par S. Thomas d'Aquin. Second edition. Translation, notes, and appendices by Th. Deman, O.P. "Éditions de la Revue des Jeunes." Tournai: Desclée et Cie., 1949. Pp. 554. Fr. belges 75.

The editors of this celebrated French translation of the *Summa* announce that this edition is to be completed as soon as possible (twelve volumes are still to appear); moreover, they announce that the volumes now out of print will be re-edited instead of being merely reprinted.

In 1925 the Reverend H. D. Noble, O.P., translated questions 47-56 for this series. The present translation by Father Deman is at once more literal and clearer. The notes are entirely rewritten and almost three times as copious. The "Technical Information" added by Father Noble was a five-page section; that of Father Deman runs to a hundred and forty-seven pages. References are fuller and more frequent.

Appendix II, called "Technical Information," takes up the history of the term "prudence," the history of the treatise, the connections of prudence, the acts of prudence, and the relation between prudence and conscience.

Father Deman stresses the importance of prudence and urges that an adequate treatment of this virtue be reinserted in our manuals of moral philosophy and theology. He shows the deficiencies of present-day treatises "on conscience" and points out that the so-called "systems for the formation of conscience" help for neither the understanding nor the practice of the good life. In this, his remarks need to be wholeheartedly seconded.

The learned commentator, in addition, urges that these systems all be abandoned. It seems that this is going too far. Even if the disappearance of prudence and a great emphasis on extrinsic principles have dislocated the life of virtue, it does not follow that these extrinsic principles have no function at all. In the first place, there exists a large body of civil and ecclesiastical law, which is not proposed to the good judgment of the subject but to his obedience (provided that it is truly law). In the second place, not everyone is always able to decide for himself the right thing to be done in every case.

For the extrinsic principles are not meant to replace prudence, but to supplement it. A man is bound to follow his own prudent judgment, if he has one; he is bound, moreover, to strive to increase in prudence. But this is a goal, not something we are endowed with from the beginning. In the meantime, it is frequently necessary to act when we do not see clearly what we are obliged to. Yet we cannot blithely disregard the real possibility of a morally evil act; such an attitude is equivalent to an acceptance of the evil. To urge nonaction at such a point smacks a bit of unreality. The ordinary man, who, after all, needs to lead the good life as well as the philosopher and the theologian, can bring himself (or be brought) to wish to do what is right, and to see what is right to a greater or less extent. But what good is such a wish if he does not know what is right?

To urge a man, in the absence of a reasonably certain knowledge of right and wrong, to avoid even the possibility of moral evil, is surrepti-

tiously and unwillingly to smuggle in the system of tutiorism under the guise of having no system at all. Thus, the absolute rejection of all systems in favor of prudence leads to the re-establishment of the inhuman system of tutiorism.

The place of "systems of conscience" should indeed be lessened in favor of prudence throughout the whole of the moral life, and the extension of prudence to cover all a man's actions should be insisted on—as an *ideal*, not as an actuality present from the beginning.

GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ

*Saint Louis University*

**MAN FOR HIMSELF.** By Erich Fromm. New York: Rinehart & Co., 1947. Pp. xiv + 254. \$3.00.

Although this book has certain valuable features, it contains some serious errors. The existence of God is denied, more by implication than by flat assertion (for example, pp. 237-40); all of man is mortal (pp. 40-42); there is no such thing as a free will (p. 232); only man himself can determine the criteria for virtue and sin (p. 12). Yet even these positions are maintained more as the result of a reaction against false alternatives (St. Augustine, for example, is classified with Luther, pp. 150, 211-12), than from false principles.

On the other hand, there are very many good things here. In contrast to the modern indifference to truth, the author eloquently and incisively insists that ethics must be objective. He has seen that there is nothing remarkable or praiseworthy in having ideals; what is important is to have true ideals (p. 50). The truth of ethics lies in its harmony with human nature, which is an objective and knowable reality (pp. 18-24). Ethics must be based on a philosophical and scientific view of man. There is a deficiency here, in that the author does not seem to realize that ethics must also rest on a metaphysics (except to the extent that he insists that everyone has a "frame of orientation and devotion" [p. 48]).

Among other good things, there is an excellent analysis of what the author calls "rational authority" (pp. 9-10), and a good account of the irrational, anonymous authority concealed in the structure of our "free, progressive" culture and school system (pp. 152, 156-57). Freud is criticized often in the course of the book for his mechanism, his exaggerated dualism, and his relativism.

The main purpose of this book is to show the relation of scientific knowledge about man (which, in the author's view, is mainly psychoanalysis) to ethics. In this connection, he insists that ethics is to be

concerned more with character than with temperament or individual virtues and vices. The good character is the productive character; the evil, the unproductive one. This view is related to the consideration of virtue as the perfection of nature and of vice as basically destructive, of self or of others. In the application of these considerations, the problem of the relation of means and ends is unsatisfactory (most likely because of a lack of a metaphysics of the good). The problem of pleasure and happiness is well treated, with insight into the philosophical and psychological conditions and tendencies involved.

THOMAS A. DAVITT, S.J.

*Saint Louis University*

**TRAITÉ DU LIBRE ARBITRE.** By Jacques Benigne Bossuet. Texto francés y traducción castellana de los alumnos del Seminario de francés. Introducción y notas por Roger Labrousse. Tucuman, Argentina: Instituto de Filosofía, 1948. Pp. 239.

The book does not claim to be a critical edition of Bossuet's *Traité*, but hopes to offer the Spanish reading public an accurate translation of the French text together with a historical introduction and an analysis of the contents which will help the reader to understand the text better.

Roger Labrousse outlines briefly and clearly the history of the problem of the relation between free will and the providence of God from the beginnings of Christianity down to the time when the *Traité* appeared, in the first decade of the eighteenth century. The analysis of the contents is lengthy and contains good comments and criticisms.

The *Traité* is concerned with the old problem of how to explain the coexistence of God's all-pervading providence and man's free will. Bossuet starts by defining free will and carefully explaining the two truths just mentioned. He then passes on to survey critically the main solutions known up to his time and decides in favor of the Thomistic solution. Bossuet is not a Thomist, but an eclectic who happens to accept the Thomist solution to a particular problem. As a matter of fact, Bossuet, in the final chapters of the book, adheres to Malebranche's occasionalism in regard to the motion of material bodies.

The translation is very faithful and accurate, though it seems to betray an effort to keep as close to the French text as good grammar allows, and so occasionally slips into minor faults in Spanish idiom by translating too literally.

JOSÉ BONET, S.J.

*Saint Louis University*

**LE POINT DE DEPART DE LA MÉTAPHYSIQUE.** Cahier V. By Joseph Maréchal, S.J. Second edition. Bruxelles: L'Édition Universelle, 1949. Pp. 625. Fr. (belges) 250.

Volume V of Father Maréchal's famous and important series was first printed in 1926 and has long been out of print. This second edition is mainly a corrected reprint of the first, with a brief introduction by Father L. Malevez, S.J., the editor, and a very few changes in the text, which were made by Father Maréchal in his own copy. Added to the text (pp. 599-608) is an article by Father Maréchal, "A Propos du *Point de Départ de la Métaphysique*," taken from the *Revue Néo-scolastique de Philosophie*, XLI (1938), 253-61.

GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ, S.J.

Saint Louis University

**QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE.** S. Thomae Aquinatis. 2 vols. Turin: Marietti, 1949. Vol. I, *De Veritate*. Edited by R. Spiazzi, O.P. Pp. xxx + 594. 2000 lire. Vol. II, *De Potentia, De Spiritualibus Creaturis, De Anima, De Unione Verbi Incarnationis, De Virtutibus in Communi, De Caritate, De Virtutibus Cardinalibus, De Correctione Fraterna, De Spe, De Malo*. Edited by P. Bazzi, O.P., M. Calcaterra, O.P., T. Centi, O.P., Ae. Odetto, O.P., and P. Pession, O.P. Pp. 950. 2500 lire.

**QUAESTIONES QUODLIBETALES.** S. Thomae Aquinatis. Edited by R. Spiazzi, O.P. Turin: Marietti, 1949. Pp. xxiii + 269. 900 lire.

This is a completely new edition, embodying the vulgate text as it is found in the best editions, but making use of all the critical work that has been so far published. Important variant readings are given in footnotes. The format is that adopted by the editors of the Ottawa *Summa*. Punctuation and paragraphing have been improved; italics have been used, somewhat freely, to bring out the structure of the argument. Parallel passages have been indicated.

There is a general introduction to the *Quaestiones Disputatae*, in which the latest results of investigations into chronology are given. Each *Quaestio* has likewise a brief special introduction. Within each *Quaestio*, the articles are numbered consecutively, for easier cross reference, and for the sake of the index. For each *Quaestio Disputata* there are four indices: a bibliographical index, a biblical index, a name index, and a subject index.

GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ, S.J.

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OPUSCULA OMNIA NECNON OPERA MINORA. VOL. I, OPUSCULA PHILOSOPHICA. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Edited by Joannes Perrier, O.P. Paris: Lethielleux, 1949. Pp. xx + 620. Fr. 1500.

This first volume contains the ten certainly authentic philosophical *Opuscula*; the continuation, in a first appendix, of the *De Regno*; and, in a second appendix, the *De Fallaciis*, *De Propositionibus Modalibus*, and the nine *Opuscula* accepted by Grabmann but rejected by Mandonnet.

This edition is entirely new. Though not critical in the strict sense of the word, it offers a text that should differ only in minor instances from the text that will ultimately be established. The basic manuscript is Paris, B. N. lat. 14546, which the editor shows to be a good copy, very carefully corrected. He has collated this manuscript with seventeen others, and with the edition of Morelles (1612). For the authentic works, the full critical apparatus is given; the same work has been done in the two appendices, though the apparatus has been omitted there. A second set of notes identifies the formal references in the text. There is an index of authors cited.

In view of the probability that the Leonine critical edition of the *Opuscula* may not appear for several generations, the editor has earned the gratitude of all scholars with this carefully prepared edition.

GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ, S.J.

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## CHRONICLE

The Saint Louis Chapter of the International Society for General Semantics met on December 9, 1949, to hear Dr. Earl English, of the University of Missouri, on "Teaching Semantics in the School of Journalism."

A new philosophical journal, *Philosophical Studies*, is devoted to the analytic movement in philosophy. It is edited by H. Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars, and is published by the University of Minnesota Press. There are six issues a year; the subscription price is \$2.50 a year.

The Southwestern Philosophical Conference held its annual meeting at the University of Texas, December 19-21, 1949. There were sessions concerned with metaphysics, value theory, and philosophical method. An afternoon panel discussion was concerned with the role of philosophy in general education. The presidential address, "Novelty and Continuity," was delivered by President David L. Miller.

"Everyman's Library" (containing over 500 titles in print), published by E. P. Dutton and Company, can now be had for 95 cents a volume.

Maurice Blondel, noted Catholic philosopher of France, died on June 4, 1949, at the age of eighty-seven. The last part of his trilogy, *La Philosophie de l'esprit chrétien*, which he had entitled *Crise de croissance et perspectives seules*, has not yet appeared in print.

The third International Thomistic Congress will take place in Rome, September 11-17, 1950. Like the former congresses, this one will be under the auspices of the Roman Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas. "Philosophy and Religion" is the general topic. The presiding officers are Cardinals Pizzardo and Mercati. The executive committee is composed of Charles Boyer, S.J., Mgr. P. Parente, B. Xiberta, O.C., P. De Rooy, O.P., Mgr. V. Bianchi Cagliesi, M. Cordovani, O.P., M. Browne, O.P., and A. Grammatico, O.P. Those that have papers to present are asked to notify the secretariate at Palazzo della Cancelleria Apostolica, Rome, as soon as possible.

The third Inter-American Congress of Philosophy was held in Mexico City, January 11-20, 1950. The themes of the congress were the importance of existentialism, the significance and scope of scientific knowledge, and American philosophy and its unity and relation to the past. The executive committee was composed of Dr. Samuel Ramos, Eduardo García Máynez, Leopoldo Zea, and the secretary, Professor Luis Villoro.

## ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF ST. THOMAS

The growing interest in St. Thomas has created a great demand, both in schools and elsewhere, for English translations of his various works. THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, continuing the work begun in the issue of November, 1948 (Vol. XXVI, No. 1), adds these new translations to the ones already published. All translations are noted, whether they are printed, mimeographed, or filed as theses in university libraries. Supplementary lists will be published as material warrants. Hence, those who are preparing any sort of translation of the writings of St. Thomas are requested to send a complete description of the translation to the editor of THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN.

In the list below, the Latin titles are printed in heavy type, and the translations are listed under them. The order of listing the Latin titles is that used by Vernon J. Bourke in his Thomistic Bibliography, 1920-1940, published by THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN.

### **De Ente et Essentia**

Maurer, A., C.S.B. *On Being and Essence*. Toronto: Institute of Medieval Studies, 1948, Pp. 64.

### **Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate**

Bosken, R. E., S.J. "The De Veritate of St. Thomas Aquinas," Q. 5. 9-10.  
With introduction and notes. Unpublished M.A. thesis, Saint Louis University, Saint Louis, 1950.

Bryde, G. W., S.J. "The De Veritate of St. Thomas Aquinas," Q. 4. 4-8.  
With introduction and notes. Unpublished M.A. thesis, Saint Louis University, Saint Louis, 1950.

Burns, R. L., S.J. "The De Veritate of St. Thomas Aquinas," Q. 5. 5-8.  
With introduction and notes. Unpublished M.A. thesis, Saint Louis University, Saint Louis, 1950.

DeRouen, R. R., S.J. "The De Veritate of St. Thomas Aquinas," Q. 4. 1-3.  
With introduction and notes. Unpublished M.A. thesis, Saint Louis University, Saint Louis, 1949.

Doran, W. J., S.J. "The De Veritate of St. Thomas Aquinas," Q. 3. 1-2.  
With introduction and notes. Unpublished M.A. thesis, Saint Louis University, Saint Louis, 1949.

McDermott, C. F., S.J. "The De Veritate of St. Thomas Aquinas," Q. 2. 12-15.  
With introduction and notes. Unpublished M.A. thesis, Saint Louis University, Saint Louis, 1949.

Weber, J. F., S.J. "The De Veritate of St. Thomas Aquinas." Q. 2. 8-11.  
With introduction and notes. Unpublished M.A. thesis, Saint Louis University, Saint Louis, 1949.

### **De Regimine Judaeorum ad Ducissam Brabantiae**

Dawson, J. C. *Selected Political Writings*. Edited with introduction by A. P. D'Entreves. "Blackwell Political Texts." New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 235.

**De Rege et Regno, sive de Regimine Principum**

Dawson, J. C. *Selected Political Writings*. Edited with introduction by A. P. D'Entreves. "Blackwell Political Texts." New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 235.

Phelan, G. B. *St. Thomas Aquinas on Kingship to the King of Cyprus*. Revised with an introduction and notes by I. Th. Eschmann, O.P. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1949. Pp. xxxix + 119.

**Quaestiones Disputatae de Spiritualibus Creaturis**

Fitzpatrick, M. C., and Wellmuth, J. J., S.J. *On Spiritual Creatures*. With an introduction. Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 135.

**In VIII Libros Physicorum Expositio**

Kocourek, R. A. *An Introduction to the Principles of Nature*. Contains translations of *In Phys. I* and *II*. St. Paul: North Central Publishing Co., 1948.

**Quaestio Disputata de Anima**

Rowan, J. F. *The Soul*. Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1949. Pp. viii + 291.

**Epistola de Modo Studendi**

White, V., O.P. *St. Thomas Aquinas De Modo Studendi*. Oxford: Blackfriars, 1944.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS  
PUBLISHED IN THE UNITED STATES

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format and the like.

The procedure is as follows:

1. Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.
2. Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.
3. Books received by THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.

ARISTOTLE. *Categoriae et Liber de Interpretatione*. Edited by L. Miao-Palaello. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 120. \$2.00

AUROBINDO, SRI. *The Life Divine*. New York: Greystone Press, 1949. Pp. 1049. \$10.00.

BARKER, SIR ERNEST. *Greek Political Theory. Plato and His Predecessors*. 3rd ed. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949. Pp. 416. \$4.50.

BERDAYEV, NICOLAS. *Towards a New Epoch*. Translated by O. F. Clarke. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. \$2.75 (approx.).

BERGSON, H. *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. Translated by T. E. Hulme. Introduction by Thomas A. Goudge. "The Little Library of Liberal Arts," No. 10. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1949. Paper, 35¢

BERTOCCI, PETER A. *The Human Venture, in Sex, Love, and Marriage*. New York: Association Press. Pp. 143. \$2.50.

BINGER, CARL ALFRED LANNING. *More about Psychiatry*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949. Pp. 214. \$4.00.

CARR, MEYRICK HEATH. *Phases of Thought in England*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 411. \$7.75.

CHASE, JOHN W. (ed.). *Years of the Modern. An American Appraisal*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co. Pp. 367. \$3.50.

CLARK, JAMES M. *The Great German Mystics, Eckhart-Tauler-Suso*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 128. \$2.75.

DANTE ALIGHIERI. *On World Government (De Monarchia)*. Translated by Herbert W. Schneider. Introduction by Dino Bigongiari. "The Little Library of Liberal Arts," No. 15. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1949. Pp. xiv + 61. Paper, 40¢

This is an excellent, though slightly abridged translation. The introduction points out the main lines of Dante's arguments and indicates to some extent their strength and weaknesses. Its analysis of the relation

which Dante sets up between church and state (separatism) is somewhat affected by a like dualism.

DE LA VEGA, FRANCIS JOSEPH, O.R.S.A. *Social Progress and Happiness in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas and Contemporary American Sociology*. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1949. Pp. xiii + 101. Paper, apply.

This doctoral dissertation (no. 104 in the philosophical series) is a well documented study, useful for its listing of secondary sources on the development and meaning of the idea of progress.

DESCARTES. *Discourse on Method*. Translated, with an introduction, by Laurence J. Lefleur. In preparation. "The Little Library of Liberal Arts," No. 19. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1949. Paper, 40¢.

DEWEY, JOHN. *Problems of Men*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1946. Pp. 424. \$5.00.

This reprint of a collection of essays that the author himself considers indicative of his present position of thought has significance in view of his recently celebrated ninetieth birthday and of the flood of writing occasioned thereby. In the introduction, he harps on his fixed fears: Catholic theology and philosophy (which he seems afraid even to name), all philosophers who are concerned with "the problem of knowledge," and logical positivism. [To be reviewed]

DEWEY, JOHN, and BENTLEY, ARTHUR F. *Knowing and the Known*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1949. Pp. xiii + 334. \$4.00.

This book developed out of a series of articles by the authors over a period of about four years. A number of chapters criticize other explanations of logic and method, while the remainder present and explain, in a highly technical jargon, Dewey's theory of logic as instrument of inquiry. [To be reviewed]

DOUGHTY, OSWALD. *Dante Gabriel Rossetti. A Victorian Romantic*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 712. \$10.00.

ELLIOTT, WILLIAM YANDELL, and McDONALD, NEIL A. *Western Political Heritage*. New York: Prentice-Hall. Pp. 1043. \$9.00.

FOSS, MARTIN. *Symbol and Metaphor in Human Experience*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 205. \$3.00.

This is a serious study of two important facets of human experience. The author uses the terms "symbol" and "metaphor" in his own special sense. Metaphor as understood by rhetoricians and literary critics is included by the author in the class of symbols, as are also analogy and simile. "Metaphor" seems to mean a dialectical process. Such a special use of terms is legitimate enough in itself; but in this case it leads to some very serious misinterpretations (for example, of the philosophical concept of analogy). On the basis of this distinction, the author approaches some of the deepest problems of philosophy. [To be reviewed]

FREUD, SIGMUND. *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*. English translation by Joan Riviere. Preface by Ernest Jones, M.D., and G. Stanley Hall. Garden City, N. Y.: Permabooks, 1949. Boards, 95¢

—. *The Future of an Illusion*. New York: Liveright Publs., 1949. Pp. 98. \$2.50.

FROST, S. E., JR. *The Basic Teachings of the Great Philosophers*. Garden City, N. Y.: Permabooks, 1949. Boards, 95¢

GUERRARD, ALBERT LEON. *Education of a Humanist*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 312. \$5.00.

HALL, MANLY P. *First Principles of Philosophy*. 2d ed. Los Angeles: Philosophical Research Soc., 1949. Pp. 200. \$3.00.

HALLOWELL, JOHN H. *Main Currents in Modern Political Thought*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1950.

HARPER, F. A. *Liberty: A Path to Its Recovery*. New York: The Foundation for Economic Education. Pp. 160. \$1.50; paper, \$1.00.

HART, SAMUEL L. *Treatise on Values*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. 165. \$3.75.

This book seizes on an important point when it bewails the current chaos of value theory. But the solution it offers, namely, that of Dewey and his school, casts no new or important light.

HAZELTON, ROGER. *Renewing the Mind. An Essay in Christian Philosophy*. New York: Macmillan Co. Pp. 204. \$2.50.

HÉLIN, MAURICE. *A History of Medieval Latin Literature*. Revised ed. Translated by Jean Chapman Snow. New York: Wm. Salloch. Pp. 135. \$3.00.

HIRIYANNA, MYSORE. *The Essentials of Indian Philosophy*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 216. \$3.50.

HOOK, SIDNEY (ed.). *John Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom*. New York: Dial Press; April, 1950. \$3.50.

*Human Rights. Comments and Interpretations*. A symposium edited by UNESCO. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Dec., 1949. Pp. 288. \$3.75.

JASPERS, KARL. *The Perennial Scope of Philosophy*. Translated by Ralph Manheim. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. 188. \$3.00.

This is a smooth and competent translation of *Der philosophische Glaube*, reviewed in THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN for May, 1949 (XXVI, 366-69). The volume is an important statement of Jaspers's position as a philosopher in relation to reality and God. Though to some extent Jaspers attempts to reduce religion to philosophy, he makes some penetrating observations on biblical religion. He shows a vigorous and sound understanding of the problems of modern man.

JONES, HOWARD MUMFORD (ed.). *Primer of Intellectual Freedom*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 206. \$2.75.

KANT, IMMANUEL. *The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*. Translated by Thomas K. Abbott. Introduction by Marvin Fox. "The Little Library of Liberal Arts," No. 16. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1949. Pp. xvi + 80. Paper, 50¢.

The introduction tries to clarify Kant's purpose in writing this work and shed some light on the categorical imperative and the various ways in which the supreme principle of morality is enunciated. It should be a very useful help to one who approaches the study of Kant's moral philosophy.

KENNY, JOHN P. *Moral Aspects of Nuremberg*. "Thomistic Studies," No. 2. Washington: Thomist Press. Pp. 180. \$3.00.

KEYSER, CASSIUS JACKSON. *Mathematics as a Culture Clue and Other Essays*. New York: Scripta Mathematica, 1947. Pp. viii + 227. \$3.75.

This is the first volume of a projected "Collected Works" series which has aroused interest outside the circle of mathematicians. It contains articles, book reviews, and addresses, bearing on such subjects as the nature of mathematics and science, the philosophical questions connected with these disciplines, and their relation to the rest of life. The ideas here contained are stimulating and very often shed much light on their subject.

KOHN, HANS. *The Twentieth Century. A Mid-Way Account of the Western World*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. \$2.50.

LAMOTT, ROBERT L. *The Conservation of Freedom*. New York: Exposition Press, 1949. Pp. 145. \$3.00.

This is a popular treatment of the nature and origin of "the free way of life." Some of the discussions of freedom and personal dignity are well done. But freedom and democracy are not well served by calling them "our Anglo-Saxon heritage." Moreover, the author perpetuates the historical fallacy that real democracy arises only from the distinctive contributions of Protestantism.

LECOMTE DU NOÜY, PIERRE. *Human Destiny*. New York: New American Lib., 1949. Pp. 189. Paper, 25¢

LEIBNIZ, GOTTFRIED WILHELM. *Philosophical Papers and Letters*. 2 vols. Translated and edited, with an Introduction by Leroy E. Loemker. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; summer, 1950.

LEWIS, CLIVE STAPLES. *The Weight of Glory, and Other Addresses*. New York: Macmillan Co. Pp. 66. \$1.25.

LEWIS, EVAN L. *The Individual and Society*. New York: Exposition Press, 1949. Pp. 111. \$3.00.

This sociological study of the place of the ordinary individual in society is a popular presentation of these basic notions, particularly with reference to present-day situations. Some philosophical areas are touched on, but rather materially than formally.

LINK, HENRY CHARLES. *The Rediscovery of Morals. With Special Reference to Race and Class Conflict*. Garden City, N. Y.: Garden City Pub. Co., 1949. Pp. 223. Boards, \$1.00.

MILLER, HUGH. *The Community of Man*. New York: Macmillan Co. Pp. 169. \$3.00.

MOHAN, ROBERT PAUL. *A Thomistic Philosophy of Civilization and Culture*. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1948. Pp. xvii + 130. Paper, apply.

This doctoral dissertation (no. 101 in the philosophical series) is an attempt to construct a Thomistic philosophy of civilization and culture. The author defines civilization as the fully rounded development of human personality within society, and culture as material advancement, with certain necessary conditions of information, liberty, and so forth. The last section of the dissertation is an extremely compressed (and superficial) presentation of the philosophy of man, moral action, and law, which the author says is presupposed in a study of civilization and culture.

NIETZSCHE, F. W. *The Use and Abuse of History*. Translated by Adrian Collins. Introduction by Julius Kraft. "The Little Library of Liberal Arts," No. 11. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1949. Paper, 40¢

NOCK, ALBERT JAY. *The Theory of Education in the United States*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.; Oct., 1949. \$2.25.

NOTOPOULOS, JAMES A. *The Platonism of Shelley*. Durham, N. C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 684. \$7.50.

PAINE, THOMAS. *Basic Writings of Thomas Paine: Common Sense; Rights of Man; Age of Reason*. Garden City, N. Y.: Halcyon House, 1949. Pp. 265. \$2.49.

PLAMENATZ, JOHN. *The English Utilitarians*. New York: Macmillan Co. Pp. 228. \$2.25.

PLATO. *Meno*. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Introduction by Fulton H. Anderson. "The Little Library of Liberal Arts," No. 12. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1949. Pp. 61. Paper, 35¢

This interesting minor work of Plato's is introduced in an equally interesting manner. The beginning student should find this an easy and profitable approach to both the thought and the style of Plato.

—. *Theaetetus*. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Introduction by Irving M. Copi. "The Little Library of Liberal Arts," No. 13. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1949. 45¢

—. *Timaeus*. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Introduction by Glenn R. Morrow. "The Little Library of Liberal Arts," No. 14. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1949. Pp. xxiv + 75. Paper, 50¢

The *Timaeus* is one of Plato's major works, and it has been given an introduction that is broad and competent, though perhaps somewhat too inclined to relate Platonic theories to modern science. The Jowett translation, as is well known, unfortunately tends in somewhat the same direction.

PLOTINUS. *The Enneads*. Translated by Stephen Mackenna. 2 vols. Boston: C. T. Branford Co. \$30.00.

QUINE, WILLARD V. *Foundations of Logic*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1950.

RADER, MELVIN M. *Ethics and Society: A Guide to Social Ideals*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1950.

RÉGIS, LOUIS-MARIE, O.P. *L'Odyssée de la Métaphysique*. Montréal: Institut d'Études Médiévales; Paris: J. Vrin, 1949. Pp. 95. \$1.50; paper, \$1.00.

This is the third annual "Conférence Albert-le-Grand" given at the Institut d'Études Médiévales. In this lecture, the president of the Institut considers the nature of metaphysics and its properties, and the relation between metaphysics, as such, and several historical systems of metaphysics: those of sensible being, being as essence, and being as thing. In a brilliant conclusion, he carries his figure of Ulysses (the mind) and Penelope (reality) into a final analogy of the "languages" which reality speaks to the mind, and concludes that the metaphysician must be a polyglot to catch all reality's accents.

REICHENBACH, HANS. *The Theory of Probability. An Inquiry into the Logical and Mathematical Foundations of the Calculus of Probability*. Translated from the German by Ernest H. Hutten and Maria Reichenbach. 2d ed. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. Pp. 508. \$12.50.

REICHERT, HERBERT W. *The Basic Concepts in the Philosophy of Gottfried Keller*. Chapel Hill, N. C.: Richard Jente, 1949. Pp. 165. \$3.00.

RUNES, DAGOBERT DAVID. *Letters to My Son*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. 92. \$2.75.

RUSSELL, BERTRAND. *Authority and the Individual*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1949. Pp. 79. \$2.00.

RZADKIEWICZ, ARNOLD L., O.F.M., *The Philosophical Bases of Human Liberty according to St. Thomas Aquinas*. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1949. Pp. ix + 185. Paper, apply.

This doctoral dissertation (no. 105 in the philosophical series) deals with the metaphysical, psychological, and ethical bases of human liberty and the relation between liberty and license, law, rights, and authority; it concludes with a survey of contemporary thought on liberty. In presenting the psychological basis of liberty, the author devotes a total of seven pages to the relation between intellect and will, in which he does not even refer to *Summa Theologiae*, I-II. 13. There is an index.

SABINE, GEORGE H. *A History of Political Theory*. Revised ed. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1950.

SARGENT, STEPHEN STANSFIELD. *The Basic Teachings of the Great Psychologists*. Garden City, N. Y.: Permabooks, 1949. Pp. 354. Boards, 95¢

SCHILPP, PAUL ARTHUR (ed.). *Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist*. Evanston: Lib. of Living Philosophers, 1949. Pp. xvi + 781. \$8.50.

This seventh volume in the well-known and valuable "Library of

"Living Philosophers" is characterized by the same variety of interesting contributions that we have come to expect. Professor Einstein contributes not only his reply, but also a significant autobiographical essay. The bibliography is a valuable part of the volume. [To be reviewed]

SCHUMACHER, LEO S. *The Philosophy of the Equitable Distribution of Wealth*. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1949. Pp. x + 138. Paper, apply.

This doctoral dissertation (no. 103 in the philosophical series) is a broadly inclusive summary of the thought of many Thomists on the subject. "Social justice" is considered to be another term for "general or legal justice."

SHEPPARD, VINCENT F., O.S.B. *Religion and the Concept of Democracy*. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1949. Pp. xi + 116. Paper, apply.

This doctoral dissertation (no. 107 in the philosophical series) is a study in social philosophy. It deals with the dignity of the individual man, the person in a democratic society, democracy as a form of government, and the modern cult of democracy.

STAUFFER, DONALD ALFRED. *Shakespeare's World of Images. The Development of His Moral Ideas*. New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1949. Pp. 393. \$5.00.

STAUFFER, ROBERT C. (ed.). *Science and Civilization*. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press. Pp. 225. \$2.50.

TAYLOR, FRANK SHERWOOD. *A Short History of Science and Scientific Thought. With Readings from the Great Scientists from the Babylonians to Einstein*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1949. Pp. 368. \$5.00.

TEGGART, FREDERICK J. *The Idea of Progress*. Revised, with introduction by George H. Hildebrand. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. \$6.00; text ed., \$4.50.

THOMAS AQUINAS, ST. *On Government and Law*. Introduction and Glossary by Dino Bigongiari. In preparation. "The Little Library of Liberal Arts," No. 20. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1949. Paper, 50¢

—. *The Soul*. Translated by John Patrick Rowan. Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1949. Pp. viii + 291. \$4.00.

This is a translation of the *Quaestio Disputata de Anima*. The translator has identified St. Thomas's sources wherever they are explicitly named, given references to parallel texts in other works, and added brief explanations of technical terms and doctrines referred to and not explained in this work; he has also added an index.

The style is sometimes awkward and involved. Moreover, it is marred by frequent blunders. For example, *potentia* is translated "power," where the term refers to prime matter as well as to operative potencies (p. 154); the phrase "*non dicuntur directe per respectum ad aliquid substantiale, sed ad aliquid accidentale*" is translated "are spoken of directly with respect to something substantial, but not with respect to something accidental" (p. 155); *sustineatur* is translated "is taken in an orthodox manner" (p. 156); *virtus animae* ("power") is translated as "a virtue" (p. 158); *videtur*, in an objection, as "it is seen" (p. 162, twice); *conveniunt*, as "convene" (p. 171); and a complex sentence with two different subjects is translated by two sentences with the same subject, (p. 174, ad 16). Technical terms are sometimes missed; for example, *mixtio minima* is translated "a mixture of the most insignificant kind" (p. 121). On page 123, the work *De pluralitate formarum* is referred to without qualification of any kind—necessarily leaving the impression that the translator believes it to be authentic.

TSANOFF, RADOSLAV A. *The Ways of Genius*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1949. Pp. xv + 310. \$3.50.

This is "an investigation of the sources, nature, and workings of genius in the arts and sciences," as the subtitle declares. A large part of the book is devoted to what might be called a theory or philosophy of the fine arts. Humanists and those interested in literary appreciation and criticism will find these chapters interesting and provocative. The sections dealing with genius in religion and mystical experience suffer from a confusion between magic, myth, and religion.

In general, the work is somewhat sketchy, perhaps because it attempts too much. The conclusion is brief and hesitant; it is naturalistic, in a very vague sort of way, implying a kind of dual aspect, or two-stage theory of matter and spirit.

TUVESON, ERNEST LEE. *Millennium and Utopia*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. \$3.50.

VAN STEENBERGHEN, FERNAND, CANON. *Epistemology*. Translated by Martin J. Flynn. New York: Jos. F. Wagner, 1949. Pp. xiv + 324.

This is a translation from the second French edition of the well-known *Épistémologie*. Canon van Steenberghen is at present the leading exponent of that view of Thomism which believes it to be, or at least to be capable of being, a critical realism.

The translation is carefully done, and yet idiomatic and easy to read. A brief bibliography and a detailed index are included.

VON BOHM-BAWERK, EUGEN; HILFERDING, RUDOLF. *Karl Marx and the Close of His System: and, Bohm-Bawerk's Criticism of Marx*. Translated from the German. Edited by Paul M. Sweezy. New York: Augustus M. Kelley. Pp. 254. \$3.50.

WHICHER, GEORGE F. *The Transcendentalist Revolt against Materialism*. Boston: Heath Pub. Co., 1949. Pp. 116. Paper, \$1.00.

WHITE, MORTON G. *Social Thought in America: The Revolt against Formalism*. New York: Viking Press, 1949. Pp. 268. \$3.50.

WILLEY, BASIL. *Nineteenth Century Studies*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. viii + 288. \$4.00.